Research on institutions for agricultural water management under the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food - Water Scarcity, Livelihoods and Food Security - page 130

Watersheds were a more common action arena for water-related institutional
studies. Johnson et al. (2009), Lebel and Daniel (2009) and Ma et al. (2008)
discuss interactions among communities, governments and firms in negotiat-
ing the trade-offs between environmental conservation and economic
development, as well as the sharing of risks and benefits. All papers acknow-
ledge that people and the rules that govern decision-making affected
outcomes. Lebel and Daniel (2009) note that multi-stakeholder planning
processes can lead to better outcomes; but they do not eliminate power
relations, which points to the need to understand the action resources that
different parties hold, and how these may be deployed to affect watershed
decision-making. The study by Johnson et al. (2009) of two watersheds in
Colombia found that the trade-offs between environmental conservation and
poverty reduction are site-specific. The interests of rich and poor were not
always in conflict, especially when there was diversification of livelihoods to
include off-farm options.
The environment-livelihoods' trade-offs play out in different ways when
fisheries are considered, again depending on the context. In coastal zones,
Gowing et al. (2006) examined the (unplanned) action arena where agri-
culture, shrimp farming and fishing conflicted. Shrimp farmers had taken
advantage of ambiguous resource tenure to expand their farms at the expense
of other livelihood activities. In the Mekong, Friend and Blake (2009)
examined the trade-offs between capture fisheries and hydropower develop-
ment, and how these played out in policy choices. Hydropower advocates had
stronger political influence because the development of their sub-sector fitted
with dominant development pathways and paradigms. Evidence on the value
of production from capture fisheries provided a potential action resource for
fisheries advocates, but Friend and Blake (2009) argued that the evidence will
not be effective unless there is broadening of the decision-making arena.
Many studies pointed to the importance of action arenas that allow multi-
stakeholder participation in decision-making (Molle et al., 2009). But Sajor
and Thu's (2009) analysis of the Saigon River showed that top-down processes
can negate participation, even if there are formal provisions for it.
Action arenas are not just about decision-making—there is also a need for
enforcement. Hagos et al. (2011) point to a lack of institutional enforcement
capacity for land use and pollution control in the Blue Nile sub-basins.
Regulations from formal institutions with command and control approaches
argued for building on existing institutions with local or self-enforcement.
Manuta et al. (2006) examined the institutional incapacities that limit the
effectiveness of flood disaster management in Southeast Asia. Hagos et al.
(2011), Manuta et al. (2006) and Sajor and Ongsakul (2007) showed that
administrative fragmentation shifted environmental costs on to the poor.
Integrated water resources management (IWRM) calls for multi-stakeholder
processes to deal with the multifaceted nature of water management. But
action arenas in which the poor were able to participate effectively, and where
decisions could be enforced, did not emerge spontaneously. Analyzing the