The institutional history of the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food - Water Scarcity, Livelihoods and Food Security - page 85

In February 2008 the CSC assigned CPWF governance to a board, which was
established in June 2008 and charged with setting the CPWF's strategic
direction and goals. The Board consisted of five members independent of the
CPWF Consortium and four representatives of the CPWF's partners, including
the Director General of IWMI (P. George, personal correspondence, 27 June
2008). The composition of the Board was designed to overcome the conflicts
of interest inherent in the CSC (CPWF, 2009a). The Board made CPWF
decisions, but was legally responsible to IWMI, which was otherwise not
involved in CPWF governance (P. George, personal correspondence, 27 June,
2008).
The seeds of tension of Challenge Programs within the CGIAR system were
sown from the start. Challenge Programs were not independent fiduciary
entities, but operated under the organizational umbrella of their respective host
Centers. In the case of the CPWF, IWMI was its host Center and served as its
legal representative, managed its finances, hosted the secretariat and oversaw
overall program management (Biswas et al., 2007, p. 3). The CPWF was
embedded within IWMI's institutional structure.
The CPWF's staff members were subject to the administrative policies of
their host and partner institutions. While the Program Coordinator (who led
the CPWF) reported to the CSC, and later the CPWF Board, it was the
Director General of IWMI (later assisted by the CPWF Board Chair) who
evaluated their performance. Similarly, some Basin Leaders and the CPWF
MT members were employed and evaluated by their respective consortium
institutions; the Program Coordinator had only limited authority over them
(Biswas et al., 2007, p. 4).
In retrospect, some tension was inevitable. The CPWF was designed as a
reform program with an innovative governance and business model (new
quality of partnerships; greater partner diversity; steering committee not
dominated by Centers; heavy reliance on competitive grants; large funds
allocation to NARES). As structured, however, the host Center retained legal
responsibility for the hosted program. The CPWF sought flexibility in
implementing its plans while IWMI understandably sought to maintain close
supervision over CPWF activities. As a reform program, the CPWF was
expected to demonstrate the benefits of a “new quality of partnerships” with,
however, no guarantee of success. The unstated assumption was that IWMI
would be willing to relinquish authority over the CPWF while retaining
responsibility for its actions. In the end, this arrangement was difficult to
maintain.
Some CGIAR Centers viewed the CPWF's mandate for competitive grants
and broader partnerships as an unnecessary burden. These Centers were
satisfied with their pre-existing partnerships and resented the time it took
scientists to write proposals for competitive funding. Moreover, despite efforts
to move beyond the traditional CGIAR partnerships, for projects in many
Centers, it was business as usual. The 2007 External Review found projects
so strongly linked to their parent Center that they were indistinguishable from