Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
Sananikone which aimed to speed up the development of a free and independent Laos. After
the 1954 Geneva Accords, which the US did not sign, considering them a sell-out to inter-
national communism, strengthening the anti-communist governments of Indochina became
a priority for President Dwight Eisenhower's administration. The withdrawal of the French
military left a power vacuum on the edge of a historically expansionist state, a worrisome
state of affairs in the eyes of the US.
As of 1955, the US was financing most of the Lao government budget and completely bank-
rolling the Royal Lao Army, countering the Viet Minh, which was shouldering the entire cost
of the Pathet Lao's army. Feeling that the French were not taking their responsibility of train-
ing the Lao army seriously enough, the US skirted the terms of the Geneva agreement by
training select officers in Thailand and by equipping and expanding the police force. Other
funds went into churning out propaganda, building roads and communications networks, and
propping up the kip. The Americans bought truckloads of the local currency above the black
market rate, burned the notes and gave the government US dollars in exchange.
For the next eight years, the US spent more on foreign aid to Laos per capita than it did on
any other Southeast Asian country, though the overwhelming majority of the aid was milit-
ary. As US dollars poured into the country, the army grew increasingly powerful and exist-
ing rivalries between leading families were reinforced, with the clans more concerned with
improving their social standing than exercising responsible power. Fretting over recent com-
munist takeovers around the world, US policies were motivated by the fear of the so-called
DominoEffect
. As President Eisenhower prepared to turn over the helm to John F. Kennedy,
he told his successor: “If Laos is lost to the free world, in the long run we will lose all of
Southeast Asia.”
The quest for unity and neutrality
After Geneva, the priority of the RLG was to regain control of the two Pathet Lao provinces
so that elections could be held in accordance with the peace settlement. But when elections
finally went ahead in December 1955, it was without the Pathet Lao, disgruntled at being
refused its demands for changes to the electoral law and freedom for its front organization,
the Lao Patriotic Front (behind which stood the Lao People's Party), to operate as a political
party. The elections resulted in the formation of a government led by
Prince Souvannaph-
ouma
, who entered into negotiations with his half-brother Souphanouvong in the belief that
national unity and neutrality were the key to the preservation of the state. The two sides cut
a deal in November 1957 to include two Pathet Lao members in a coalition government in
exchange for the reintegration of Hua Phan and Phongsali into the rest of Laos.
Left alone, it seemed, the people of Laos could work out their problems, or so Souvannaph-
ouma thought. However, when elections the following May gave leftist candidates 21 seats
in the National Assembly, the US embassy and the CIA actively promoted the creation of the
