Global Positioning System Reference
In-Depth Information
rockets. 51 It predicted sending up the first satellite two years from the start of
the program. Its main scientific objective was in the field of geodesy—using a
satellite to make more accurate measurements of the earth, which would help
in “tying together the various continental grids and locating the many islands
with respect to these grids.” 52 Geodesists relied on the moon as a reference
point for making measurements in the middle of the ocean, and a satellite, by
virtue of its closer proximity, would improve accuracy tenfold. In this case, a
satellite truly would function as a “man-made moon.” The data would yield
practical and militarily significant results, the proposal notes: “Improved geo-
detic data is required to provide maps of sufficient accuracy for locating poten-
tial military targets and Loran navigation stations.” 53 Loran, short for long-range
navigation, was a land-based system of radio beacons operated by the Coast
Guard. Left unstated is the reason the proposed partner in the effort, the Army
Map Service, was interested in pinpointing several Pacific islands—they were
to be used in icbm test flights.
Beyond proving that a satellite had achieved orbit, other considerations fac-
tored in selecting the igy satellite program. Among the concerns were how to
keep the time and resources required from delaying existing military programs
(no civilian organization had the wherewithal); how, for strategic and public
relations purposes, to portray the launching of a satellite as a scientific rather
than a military exercise; and how to keep sensitive military secrets from leak-
ing out with published scientific findings. The National Security Council
weighed these concerns, established policies for the program, and put the
Department of Defense in charge of it in a secret directive, nsc 5520, adopted
on May 26, 1955 . 54 President Eisenhower approved the directive the next day.
Fateful Decision
Responsibility for deciding among the competing proposals fell to Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Development Donald Quarles, who
asked an ad-hoc, eight-member selection committee to review the proposals.
The panel included experts and scholars appointed by each branch of the mil-
itary. Homer J. Stewart, an aeronautical engineer at the California Institute of
Technology's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, chaired the committee, which came
to be known as the Stewart Committee. 55 The group met in full or in part
numerous times throughout the month of July 1955, even visiting the Martin
Company factory in Baltimore to view rocket production. 56 President Eisen-
hower, however, did not wait for the Stewart Committee's decision before
 
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