New Moons Rising - GPS Declassified: From Smart Bombs to Smartphones - page 7

moons” were to transmit radio signals on a predetermined frequency, allow-
ing scientists around the world to track those achieving orbit. Calling orbiting
satellites man-made moons seems quaint now, but in those days, headline
writers needed a description that average newspaper readers could grasp, as
shown in a United Press headline from February 15, 1956, in the Sarasota (fl)
Herald- Tribune : “First Man-Made Moon May Be Visible in 1957.” 38 The story
introduces the term “artificial earth satellite” in the second paragraph and
sticks with “satellite” for all but one reference through the rest of the story.
Project Vanguard's director, Hagen, tells the reporter that to see the satellite,
traveling from horizon to horizon in eight to twelve minutes at eighteen thou-
sand miles per hour, “will take a little doing,” even with binoculars. 39 Accord-
ing to the United Press story, the United States planned to launch ten satellites
in all, the first being 30 inches in diameter and weighing twenty-one and a half
pounds. That is larger than the 20-inch size that was ultimately decided upon,
and much larger than the 6.44-inch “grapefruit” placed atop tv- 3.
The shortcomings of trying to track a satellite visually, even using powerful
telescopes, was a major factor in the selection of Project Vanguard as the igy
satellite program. After the U.S. National Committee for the International
Geophysical Year decided, in early 1955, that the nation's participation should
include launching a satellite, the Army, Navy, and Air Force put forth compet-
ing proposals for this chance to make history. All three had active rocketry pro-
grams, and interservice rivalry for priority and funding of weapons systems
was intense. All three proposed modifying existing rockets, but only the Naval
Research Laboratory proposed using one not tied to an existing military
purpose—the Viking. The Army's Redstone and Air Force's Atlas rocket pro-
grams were part of the country's nascent intermediate-range ballistic missile
(irbm) and intercontinental ballistic missile (icbm) fleets, and the Air Force
had already begun developing plans for a military satellite to be launched using
Atlas or Titan rockets.
The contrasting Army and Navy satellite proposals illustrate the trade-ofs
that early satellite designers faced in terms of size, weight, and functionality.
A smaller, lighter satellite would be easier to put into orbit but hard to verify.
If it achieved orbit, what further value could it offer to justify the effort and
expense? A larger, heavier satellite could hold the instrumentation and batter-
ies needed to transmit tracking signals and other data over a period of time,
but lifting more weight high enough for a stable orbit stretched the capabili-
ties of existing rockets. The Army proposed launching a small, ive-pound sat-