Going to War - GPS Declassified: From Smart Bombs to Smartphones - page 119

optimize the incomplete constellation for use in Iraq. Before the October
launch, Space Command altered that satellite's orbit to increase its visibility
over the Persian Gulf and shortened the testing and preparation phase to get
it into service faster. 76 Tinkering with the constellation placed three satellites
in view for nearly round-the-clock two-dimensional coverage (latitude and
longitude, needed for ground and ocean-surface operations) and provided four
satellites in view for three-dimensional coverage (latitude, longitude, and alti-
tude, needed for airplanes) for about eighteen hours a day. 77 At the time, three-
dimensional coverage over Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for example, was
available only fifteen hours per day.
During the crisis three satellites experienced problems that kept technicians
of the 2nd Satellite Control Squadron (now called the 2nd Space Operations
Squadron) busy designing workarounds. 78 In August 1990 a twelve-year-old
satellite (the third experimental Block i satellite, launched in October 1978)
lost 40 percent of the power from its solar panels. By shutting down gps sig-
nal transmissions and nonessential power uses during periods when the solar
panels were in the earth's shadow, ground controllers kept the batteries
recharged and providing coverage over the Persian Gulf. 79 On December 10
a stabilizer on another older satellite (the sixth Block i satellite, launched in
April 1980) malfunctioned, and technicians devised a way to keep its solar
panels angled toward the sun and its antennas pointed toward the earth. 80
Ground crews kept it partially working during the war, but they permanently
removed it from the constellation in March 1991. 81 Also in December, the solar
panels aboard the newest satellite, just launched November 26, became stuck
in a fixed position, and ground controllers had to adjust them manually for
the remainder of the war. 82
In sum, the Persian Gulf War served as a sort of beta test for gps- guided
munitions but offered more of a full dress rehearsal for the system as a navi-
gational aid for foot soldiers, ground vehicles, ships, and aircraft. For stateside
ground crews managing the sometimes-balky satellites, it was a time of out-
right experimentation similar to what nasa faced during the moon race.
After the war the Pentagon concluded, “gps was used more extensively than
planned and met navigation and positioning requirements. . . . gps should be
considered for incorporation into all weapon systems and platforms.” 83 Those
military leaders who argued in 1981 that “it may be difficult to understand the
full potential until the system is deployed and the vast number of potential users
are able to see what it will do for them” undoubtedly felt vindicated. 84 The war's