Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
human addiction to exosomatic comfort? Georgescu-
Roegen's (1975, 379) answer was not hopeful: ''Per-
haps, the destiny of man is to have a short, but fiery,
exciting and extravagant life rather than a long, un-
eventful and vegetative existence. Let other species—the
amoebas, for example—which have no spiritual ambi-
tions inherit the earth still bathed in plenty of sunshine.''
Such musings appear to be incontestable. Unless our
species leaves this planet, the only possible strategy to
maximize the duration of our terrestrial tenure is to
minimize entropic drift, a strategy that may require a
gradually declining population in order to channel solar
radiation into increasingly energy-intensive procurement
of materials. And yet the exaltation of entropy misses
some key points. On the most fundamental level, Brooks
and Wiley (1986) argue, life's evolutionary entropic be-
havior is not determined by energy flow because this can-
not explain the existence of organisms, their variability
or structure. Life's evolution depends on mutations, and
there is no link between them and energy flow analogous
to the role energy plays in organizing nonliving systems.
Life's intrinsic properties determine how energy flows,
not the other way around. Epigenetic information chan-
nels energy into maintenance, growth, differentiation,
and reproduction; these irreversible transformations dissi-
pate both matter and energy.
Evolution is thus inevitably entropic, but the availabil-
ity of energy is not its guiding force. Layzer (1988)
extended the caveat to material flow as well. Its free flow,
much like energy flow, is essential, but neither one drives
the evolutionary process because the ability of organisms
to mobilize free energy and to organize matter stems
from the reproductive instability of genetic material.
In practical terms, entropic concerns extend far beyond
any rational planning horizon of half a century. During
that time we are much more likely to be constrained by
environmental changes than by scarcities of low-entropy
energies and materials. And in longer run there is an
enormous potential for material substitutability (Goeller
and Weinberg 1976). We cannot exclude the eventual
possibility of virtually unlimited energy from extraterres-
trial capture of solar radiation or from advanced nuclear
techniques. In any case, our inability to forecast and to
comprehend complex wholes relegates any scenarios of
distant futures to the category of speculation.
It turns out that even rational attempts to guide
societies by energy-based valuations rather than by ad-
mittedly inadequate or misleading monetary appraisals
are rather impractical. The impulse behind such attempts
is understandable. The inadequacies of standard mone-
tary accounts are indisputable: omissions of subsistence
food production, barter, and black market activities; dis-
tortions of prevailing terms of trade and exchange rates;
uncertain purchasing power parities. In addition, moneti-
zation becomes challenging when valuing nonrenewable
resources, degradation or destruction of public goods,
and the true worth of indispensable biospheric services.
These fundamentals are either entirely beyond the realm
of standard pricing, or their valuations have failed to
capture their finite nature and low entropy. In contrast,
energy-based valuation has the appeal of rigor and uni-
versality for those who approach economics via the natu-
ral sciences or engineering.
The line of these advocates extends from Ostwald
(1909); to the Technical Alliance, later Technocracy,
formed by Howard Scott in 1918 (Technocracy 1937);
to Soddy (1926), Cottrell (1955), and Odum (1971;
1975); and to some proponents of energy analysis during
the 1970s (see chapter 10). The link with ecological
thinking has been a strong part of this movement. By set-
