Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
circumstances may, in those cases, force indi-
viduals to engage in unsustainable resource
extraction strategies. In those cases, arguments
appealing to an individual's civic responsibility
are unlikely to be taken into consideration when
engaging in resource use and extraction.
Another informal strategy to change behavior
toward natural resource use through voluntary
means is by applying pressure on individuals
to adopt and abide by conservation practices
that are in the long-term interest of all stake-
holders. The mutual enforcement of informal
rules amongst members of a community depend-
ent on a particular resource provides a case in
point. For instance, as Acheson and Brewer
(2003) detailed in the case of the lobster i shery
off the coast of Maine, informal rules and an
aggressively protected territorial system, guard
against incursions by newcomers and ensure a
sustainable livelihood for well-established lob-
stering communities. In another example, i sh-
erfolk along the western coast and estuaries of
India abstain from i shing during the religiously
auspicious month of
shraavan
, which also coin-
cides with the monsoon season and i sh-
spawning cycles. In this case, religious tradition
melds with a conservation practice that allows
for the sustainability of local i sh stocks and
livelihoods.
Formal conservation management strategies
are more ubiquitous, and some might argue
more effective at promoting conservation
behavior through either a regulatory approach
or a system of incentives and disincentives.
Command-and-control approaches attempt to
change the environmental behavior of individu-
als or companies directly through legislation.
These approaches include enforcement mecha-
nisms through a system of i nes and penal-
ties that ensure compliance. Chapter 14 more
fully explores environmental laws, policy and
standards explicitly targeted toward wetland
conservation.
Other formal incentive-based wetland conser-
vation strategies provide more l exibility in
meeting environmental objectives than their
command-and-control counterparts. These strat-
egies seek to employ market approaches through
taxes, fees, charges, subsidies, tradable credits,
bonds, covenants, easements, transfer of devel-
opment rights and the like to urge individuals
to adopt conservation practices that work for
the larger common good (Hackett 2006). Econo-
mists have argued that such approaches provide
adequate incentives for conservation-seeking
behavior and encourage companies to innovate
by coming up with greener technologies that
make them more competitive.
Examples of direct and indirect incentives-
based strategies for wetland conservation are
found at both the federal and state levels in the
United States. For instance, several states charge
a special tax on the sale of fertilizers and pes-
ticides. This money is often set aside for water-
pollution abatement programs. Non-point source
pollution such as runoff from agricultural i elds
is particularly difi cult to track and monitor.
Hence, such indirect taxes seek to instill more
judicious pesticide and fertilizer use by farmers.
In other cases, point sources of pollution from
factories are easier to monitor and are assessed
discharge fees.
At the federal level several programs exist to
incentivize wetland conservation programs
directly. The U.S. Natural Resources Conser-
vation Service (NRCS) oversees the Wetlands
Reserve Program (WRP) created through the
1990 Farm Bill, which currently provides pay-
ments to farmers who restore and protect once
farmed wetlands on their property (NRCS 1996).
Over 900,000 hectares are currently enrolled in
the WRP across the United States (Fig. 12-7;
NRCS 2010b). In another program intended to
reverse the decline in waterfowl populations the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, through the North
American Waterfowl Management Plan, gives
farmers economic incentives for incorporating
farming practices that could benei t waterfowl
habitat (NRCS 1996).
Similar tax and incentive programs in coun-
tries across the world attempt to balance
development needs with wetland conservation
practices. For instance, the European Union
(EU) imposes environmental taxes and fees
on pesticides, landi lls, and water pollution
(Hackett 2006). The EU provides authorization
to individual countries to promote wise-use
farming practices that incorporate the
