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In-Depth Information
economics minister had the temerity to devalue the peso, agricultural
exports again became competitive, but urbanites suffered from sharply
rising prices for consumer items. The rate of inflation brought intense
pressure on the peso's value every two years or so, forcing the gov-
ernment to make another unpopular no-win economic decision. The
two-year cycle also coincided with the life expectancy of an Argentine
presidency.
The military and civilian governments that followed the revolution
of 1955 essentially carried on with Perón's populist economic policies.
Army and navy officers spent part of their careers in the state industries,
some of which were traditionally run by a general or an admiral. All of
them deemed industrialization to be a matter of high national security.
Neither military nor civilian presidents ever seriously considered cut-
ting back the public sector, for their tenuous holds on power could not
withstand the outcry of bureaucrats and workers who would lose their
jobs. Even in the private sector, the industrialists depended on political
favoritism to protect market monopolies and obtain licenses to import
technology and exchange currencies. When a government appeared
weak, the domestic investors sought safety by cutting back on invest-
ments and sending the money out of the country. When the occupant of
the Casa Rosada appeared powerful, the private entrepreneurs repatri-
ated their savings and invested in domestic expansion.
Foreign investment, however, flourished in this unstable milieu, at
the expense of domestic private industrialists. Multinational corpora-
tions had the advantage of sources of capital independent of govern-
ment favoritism. They generated their own technologies in their home
economies and benefited from their prior experience in efficiently
manufacturing the latest consumer products. International Business
Machines (IBM), Palmolive, DuPont, and Monsanto all expanded in
Argentina in the 1950s and 1960s, while Argentine companies sold out
to the multinationals. Overseas investors bought nearly 40 local busi-
nesses in banking, cigarette manufacturing, and chemicals between
1962 and 1968.
As in the days of British investment, the new companies brought in
their own non-Argentine top managers. This time, however, middle
management, supervisors, and manual workers were mostly Argentines,
and the presence of foreigners in the new industries was not so preva-
lent as in the liberal age. It was simply recognized as good business for
the multinational companies to train managers and workers from the
ample pool of educated Argentines, because it saved on the high wages
that foreigners demanded. Eventually, the head manager at compa-
