Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
public opinion against concessions to British meatpackers and rail-
ways. When Great Britain imported Argentine meat and cereals but
postponed the payment for these items with British gold reserves for
the duration of World War II, the South American producers became
ever more indignant. They could not even exchange their produce for
manufactured goods, as British industry had been converted to pro-
ducing the machinery of war. Thus, a large Argentine gold reserve was
building up in Britain.
A pro-U.S. policy also contained little satisfaction for the national-
ists. As the Argentine government equivocated while all other Latin
American nations declared war on the Axis in 1942, the United States
began criticizing Argentina as being pro-Nazi. Indeed, German doctrine
had been a part of every officer's training from the military academy
through the general staff college. The generals who served as heads
of state in the 1930s proudly stood for photographs in the army dress
uniforms that featured the spiked helmets and Prussian capes similar to
those worn by the kaiser's officers in World War I. But the United States
had never been a good trading partner to Argentina. U.S. farm lobbies
had always pressured Congress to keep Argentine wheat and meat off
the domestic market.
Faced with the sharp decline in exports in the early 1940s, the civil-
ian administration found it difficult to carry out any coherent policies in
the polarized political atmosphere. The transition of power was bound to
be troublesome as the 1943 presidential elections approached. President
Ortiz's health declined, and he resigned in 1940. His vice presidential
successor, Ramón S. Castillo, represented the pro-Allies Conservative
Party oligarchs of the interior. As president, Castillo was planning for the
1943 election of another interior oligarch—presumably through voter
fraud—which appealed neither to the nationalists nor to the Radicals.
A profound sense of pessimism afflicted the political climate in 1943,
preparing the public for another military intervention.
The June 1943 coup d'état had no particular plan except that its
army leaders had decided not to share power after the coup with civil-
ian politicians. Civilians were nevertheless involved. Politicians from
both branches of the Radical lineage and even some Conservatives who
abhorred their own candidate had held talks with military personnel
about a possible ouster. Officers of all political persuasions—some
pro-Allies, some pro-Axis, and others nationalist—were mildly sup-
portive. Even the president had heard rumors of military conspiracies
but could do little to fend them off. The so-called Grupo de Oficiales
Unidos (United Officers' Group), or GOU, a secret lodge of field-grade
