Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
A second definition similarly describes a covert channel as “any method that al-
lows the transmission of information via one or more global system variable not
officially designed for that purpose. 2
5 . 1 C a t e g o r i e s
Covert channels can be divided into two main categories: storage channels and
timing channels . Their purpose is basically the same; they differ only in how the
information is made available.
The first category uses a shared global variable (an area of memory for IT spe-
cialists, for example, or a letter for a prisoner) which acts as a transmission channel
in which one of the two communicating parties can make changes to be read directly
or indirectly by the other. The second category allows us to transmit information by
modulating use of particular system resources (CPU time, receipt of a packet and
the relative response and so on), so as to exploit the differences from normal opera-
tion to codify the information transmitted. We can also create hybrid covert channels
combining the two methods described above to make the hidden channel even more
difficult to detect.
Where earlier research focused on covert channels that allowed information flows
between different processes in the same system, more recently interest has shifted
to allowing information to be sent from one host to another using channels exploit-
ing various possibilities offered by network protocols that are today the basis of the
Internet.
5 . 2 N e t w o r k C o v e r t C h a n n e l s : C u r r e n t U s e
TCP/IP protocols offer many ways to establish covert channels and transmit data
between hosts. Such methods can then be used for the following purposes (see next
page):
To by-pass perimeter security devices;
To implement techniques to evade network sniffers and NIDS;
To encapsulate information, encrypted or otherwise, in ordinary packets for
secret transmission in networks that prohibit such behavior (this is known as
TCP/IP Steganography ).
Here we will not only discuss techniques for manipulating TCP/IP headers, but
also those used for the ICMP protocol and higher levels such as HTTP and DNS.
2 Estimating and Measuring Covert Channel Bandwidth in Multilevel Secure Operating Systems ,
by Shiuh-Pyng Shieh . The translation is ours.
Search WWH ::




Custom Search