Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
• NPP Technical Solution with permission
for putting into stationary (permanent)
operation.
hand, and the Ukrainian regulatory authority and
its technical support organization SSTC NRS on
the other hand in the safety assessment for SPDS
implementation at Ukrainian NPPs.
In compliance with regulatory safety require-
ments of Ukraine, the SPDS was classified as a
safety-related normal operating system - clas-
sification notation 3N.
The SPDS developers were aware of regula-
tory requirements of Ukraine (NP, 2000,a; NP,
2000,b) considered their requirements in system
development process.
Requirements for SPDS are set forth in US
document (USNRC, 1981) and international
standard (IEC, 1988), which applies to all safety
parameter display systems; the safety criteria in
this standard agree with the SPDS criteria from
NUREG-0696.
In the SPDS safety assessment, Ukrainian regu-
latory requirements on safety and requirements of
NUREG-0696 and IEC 60960 were compared.
Priority was given to regulatory requirements of
Ukraine.
The following groups of requirements were
taken into account in the safety assessment of
SPDS referred to safety systems of class 3N:
Solutions and Recommendations
Safety parameters display systems, which are
described below, are separated from another in-
dividual I&C system - unit computer information
systems (CIS). Both systems - SPDS and CIS -
give information to personal for NPP unit control.
SPDS exerted positive influence on NPP
safety; a lot of instruction for NPP personal were
elaborated specially for using with SPDS.
The most parts of CIS “Complex-Titan” was
elaborated in 1985-1990: there was USSR design
with old hardware components. There was only
one exception - CIS of South-Ukrainian NPP-1,
which was the modification of old CIS. Modern-
ized system was elaborated by “Westinghouse
Electric Company” and LLC “Westron” (as
SPDS) and used hardware and software similar
as SPDS (Emphasize, that CIS and SPDS of
South-Ukrainian NPP are independent systems),
but SPDS and CIS of South-Ukrainian NPP-1
have some level of integration.
Experience of SPDS operation confirmed ad-
vantages of further integration CIS and SPDS. All
new CIS in Ukraine was integrated with SPDS.
1. Reliability of functions performed;
2. Quality of functions performed;
3. Absence of impacts on other systems;
4. Stability of functions performed;
5. Procedures for confirmation of compliance
with safety requirements.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The SPDS were implemented at Khmelnitsky
NPP-1, Zaporozhe NPP-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, Rovno
NPP-3 and South-Ukrainian NPP-1, 2, 3.
It should be noted that in spite of some differ-
ences of the national regulatory framework of US
as used in the development and implementation of
SPDS from the Ukrainian regulatory framework,
there had been no special difficulties in under-
standing between the developer (supplier) of the
systems and operating organization on the one
The set of critical safety functions began to form
after the TMI accident. The Fukushima-1 lessons
shown that it is necessary to introduce new safety
functions in addition to the existing ones. One
of these functions is spent fuel pool monitoring.
Correspondingly, a set of critical functions in
SPDS have to be expanded. New functions have
to be included to SPDS.
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