Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Figure 5. Global influence matrix
example, it was implemented a security
bit, which controls the readability of chip
configuration) to resist such attacks.
3. Cloning Attack: In SRAM FPGA chips,
a configuration file is stored in nonvola-
tile memory outside FPGA chip, allowing
quite easily retrieve a bitstream while load-
ing configuration in the FPGA and clone
such FPGA electronic design of such chip
afterwards. The only variant of protection
against this threat is encrypting a bitstream
during its transmission from a nonvolatile
memory to the FPGA that has been already
implemented in most modern FPGAs.
Therefore, the strength of applied cipher is
an open-ended question.
4. Physical attack against SRAM-based
FPGAs: The objective of such an attack is
to obtain information concerning physical
structure of FPGA chip by studying specific
areas in the chip. Such attacks are usually
targeted on FPGA parts inaccessible through
input-output channels. Instruments, based
on focusing of ion beam, allowing FPGA
structure checking, are used for the attack.
It is rather difficult to implement such attack
due to complexity of required equipment;
besides that, some technologies (for example,
Antifuse and Flash), which have their own
restrictions, significantly complicate such
mode of attacks.
5. Side-Channel Attack: Such an attack
uses specifics of systems' physical imple-
mentation in order to obtain information
concerning power consumption, execution
time and electromagnetic fields, allowing
an adversary to obtain power, time and/
or electromagnetic signatures, which, in
turn, can expose information about their
underlying implementation. Hence, in or-
der to implement side-channel attack, it is
required to solve a task of obtaining such
Search WWH ::




Custom Search