Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
violating any restrictive national regulations.
163
Transparency would also help to
prevent any kind of corruption, e.g. if an annual transparency report were issued. To
avoid a “guarantee culture”, the use of guarantees by the state should be restricted to
events that the private operator is not able to control, handle or anticipate itself.
164
Governments should make sure that all guarantees have a
and
appear in the annual budget report.
165
This would involve all costs (even if they are
only predicted) being capped and published. In addition, there could be a contrac-
tual agreement like
'
quantitative ceiling
'
,
related to financial support by the state to avoid misuse by the private sector,
166
or
the government could claim guarantee fees during a warranty case.
167
A PPP may create new jobs as most private operators recruit their staff within the
host state.
168
With the training of staff and the building of a new project, there is
also a transfer of know-how.
169
Lastly, in cases of a PPP, the government can also
obtain an asset without paying too much.
170
(
...
) helping on the downside / profit of the upside (
...
)
'
'
1.3.8 Assessment of the Benefits and Drawbacks
In most cases where a PPP has failed or has not lived up to the expectations of the
parties involved and critical mistakes have been made, such as incorrect risk
allocation, insufficient transparency, etc., it is important to understand that the
drawbacks of PPPs mostly stem from the behavior of the parties. Consequently, it
is wrong to condemn PPPs straightaway. Undesirable party behavior can occur in
every form of cooperation, which does not mean that the respective cooperation is
problematic. Due to the complexity of the Desertec Concept, all forms of cooper-
ation could face similar problems, which mean that the argument against the
complexity of PPPs is not a convincing one.
Overall, all the positives and negatives add up to a list of prerequisites for a
successful PPP. This encompasses: political will, public acceptance, an adequate
legal framework, a feasibility study (including a PSC), adequate allocation of risks,
projects of a suitable size for the country, clear output specifications, flexibility due
to the long-term contract, adequate public-sector institutional capacity to handle the
PPP programs as a whole and to deal with individual projects, supervision possi-
bilities, and a transparent process. Morocco could also demand that an investor
163
European Commission (
2004b
), 3.
164
Hemming (
2006
), 10; Hemming (
2008
), 235 (241).
165
Hemming (
2006
), 11-12.
166
Estache et al. (
2007
), 19.
167
Hemming (
2006
), 12.
168
Metje (
2008
), 47.
169
DIHK and bfai (
2006
), 12.
170
Irwin (
2008
), 105 (106).
