Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
2.3.6 Evaluation of ICSID Jurisdiction
Overall, ICSID arbitration offers a better investment protection than other arbitra-
tion institutions, mostly due better enforceability of awards and the option of
annulments. ICSID tribunals have gained a vast experience of negotiating invest-
ment disputes over the past few decades. The still rising number of cases also
underlines the acceptance of ICSID as an international arbitration institution. The
practical benefits of international investment arbitration are obvious (impartiality
and effectiveness as just two examples).
332
It is repeatedly emphasized that there is
no arbitration court as powerful as the ICSID, which makes it very successful.
333
Another benefit of ICSID jurisdiction is the above-mentioned neutrality of the
ICSID tribunals. The ICSID process is completely self-contained (respectively
self-sufficient) and therefore “delocalized”.
334
Other arbitration convention,
e.g. the NY Convention, leaves enforcement to domestic law or other applicable
treaties, unlike the ICSID Convention.
335
Furthermore, ICSID cost schedules are transparent and structured.
336
It is some-
times pointed out that the voluntary execution of ICSID verdicts is due to it being a
part of the World Bank
s institution.
337
The World Bank might interpret disobedi-
ence as a loss of political credibility.
338
Publication of all proceedings and core
elements (e.g. parties to the disputes) are done by the Secretary-General online or in
an ICSID Annual Report.
339
It is beneficial to publicize the arbitration process so
that the state cannot “cloak” proceedings.
340
'
332
Walter (
2006
), 815 (816).
333
Mortenson (
2010
), 257 (265) and (267).
334
Reed et al. (
2004
), 8; Delaume (
1983
), 784 (784); Griebel (
2008
), 119; Moses (
2008
), 225-226;
cf Brower et al. (
2009
), 843 (848); Horn (
2008
), 587 (592); Jagusch et al. (
2010
), 75 (98);
Therewith the investor is not subject to political uncertainties, in: Vannieuwenhuyse (
2009
),
115 (119); Dolzer and Schreuer (
2008
), 223; cf Metje (
2008
), 167; Depoliticized, in: UNCTAD
(
2010b
), XXII; Depoliticized, because no politicians are members of ICSID tribunals,
in:
Nmehielle (
2001
), 21 (24-25).
335
Griebel (
2008
), 119; Reed et al. (
2004
), 8; cf Harten and Loughlin (
2006
), 121 (135).
336
Reed et al. (
2004
), 9; Griebel (
2008
), 120-121; A more transparent ICSID proceeding today, in:
Egonu (
2007
), 479 (483).
337
Reed et al. (
2004
), 9; cf Hunter (
2007
), 165 (170).
338
Adverse political and financial consequences, in: Brower et al. (
2009
), 843 (847); McIlwrath
and Savage (
2010
), 393-394 para 7-059; Hunter (
2007
), 165 (170); cf Jagusch et al. (
2010
),
75 (97-98); Reed et al. (
2004
), 9; Pressure of international financial institutions, in: Harten and
Loughlin (
2006
), 121 (134); Griebel (
2008
), 121.
339
Egonu (
2007
), 479 (482); Lorcher (
2005
), 11 (16); cf Partasides and Fullelove (
2010
), 1 (10);
Jagusch et al. (
2010
), 75 (97).
340
There is an public interest in the publication of awards, because it often involves public
services, in: Egonu (
2007
), 479 (487-488); Public interest, in: Tietje (
2005
), 47 (60); Great
transparency for international arbitration, in: McIlwrath and Savage (
2010
), 391 para 7-051;
Griebel (
2008
), 120; Reed et al. (
2004
), 9; Disclosure because of public policy grounds, in:
Trakman (
2002
), 1 (5).
