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occurred in utility for either the seller or buyer agent. As shown, the dynamic
occurrence of non-monotonic behaviour in static strategy settings is not a negligi-
ble side-effect. In such scenarios the variation is higher in the case of oppositional
applied time-dependent tactics in the mix, such as conceder against boulware.
In the second, multi-issue scenario we use issue 1 and 2 from example 2 with
s/b CrS CrL BrS BrL
CrS 4/0.09 4/0.09 70/0.47 100/0.14
CrL 16/0.01 22/0.04 99/0.24 100/0.09
BrS 74/0.46 48/0.55 0/0 0/0
BrL 99/0.13 100/0.26 0/0 0/0
(a) Non-monotonicity in single-issue negotiation (rate in %/max. variation in utility)
s/b CaS CaL BaS BaL
CaS 0/0 7/0.03 30/0.45 100/0.19
CaL 9/0.06 23/0.03 88/0.45 100/0.18
BaS 89/0.36 89/0.43
0/0
0/0
BaL 88/0.06 100/0.16
0/0
0/0
Buyer Strategies: CaS
CaL
Buyer Strategies: BaS
CaL
Buyer Strategies: BaS
BaL
U
s
U
s
U
s
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
Buyer Strategies: CaS
CaL
Buyer Strategies: BaS
CaL
Buyer Strategies: BaS
BaL
U
b
U
b
U
b
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
linear combination
constrained linear
thread
based
concession
based
Fig. 2.
Buyer's (bottom) and seller's (top) aggregated utilities
the above deadline settings to compare the different mixing mechanisms (cf. 2.1
to 3.2) applying the same strategy groups. Due to the large number of possible
strategy assignments we choose three scenarios where the buyer applies more
cooperative (CaS/CaL), more competitive strategies (BaS/Bal) for both issues,
or a mixture of both (BaS/CaL), whereas the seller is cooperative for issue 1
(CaS) and applies different combinations for issue 2. The results in Figures 2(b)
and 2(c) show that choosing a different mechanism for mixing the same set of
tactics has a strong effect on the negotiation outcomes in many scenarios. In
each diagram a group of bars represent the aggregated linear utility (cf. Sec-
tion 2.1) for the different mixing mechanisms applied for one strategy group,
