Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
the objectivity of nature' (CN pp. 30-31). We stopped believing,
at that time, in matter animated by a final cause, with an aim sup-
posedly inherent in it, to conceive of it rather as inert and influ-
enced exclusively by external causes.
Aristotelism, which was the dominant mode of thought before
the scientific revolution, assumes that there is a natural order
intrinsic to the world. Each thing is said to have a principle of
movement or change which forces it to comply with its essence,
i.e. to bring about its finality. For a physical object, this means
inherent and spontaneous movement towards its natural place of
rest. For example, light objects are supposed to rise upwards and
heavy ones fall downwards. This is a general system of thought
which does not exclusively concern physics, according to which
every thing that exists has an essence that determines its behaviour
(existence). This system of thought collapsed between the 14th and
17th centuries when the principle of inertia was formulated, abol-
ishing finality and asserting that only external causes act on a body,
the latter possessing no activity of its own guiding its fate. This is
the principle underlying all modern science.
Indeed, since the existence of things is not determined by intrin-
sic essence but by the external influences to which they are subject
to, there can be no order immanent in the world. It is constructed
'here and now' during all the various kinds of processes which occur
there. From this there arises the need to experiment because, in
order to understand a phenomenon, one can no longer content one-
self with defining the essence of things, as was possible in
Scholasticism. It has to be analysed by experiment.
To really grasp this major point, let us take the example of the
falling stone. Once the essentialist has seen that it falls, and has
asserted that it falls because falling complies with its finality
(its essence), there is no longer any mystery to the phenomenon and
the explanation is enough in itself, for all time. Each occasion when
the initial observation of the stone falling is repeated only serves to
confirm this. If the stone does not fall, because it is prevented by an
obstacle for example, that does not invalidate the finalist explanation.
It just shows that bringing about its finality has been impeded.
