Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
physics but fit together according to the instructions relating to this
information. There would therefore seem to be a difference in kind
between physics and biology. In physics, order would seem to be
epistemological
4
whereas it is supposed to be ontological
5
in biology.
This analysis by Schrödinger (1944) is the basis for the theory of
genetic programming. It has been dominating molecular biology
since it started but its historical and philosophical roots are a great
deal older. Genetic information is equivalent to the formal cause, or
to the soul, in Aristotle's philosophy. It is an order principle which
determines an invariable organisation of living beings corresponding
to the species. This analogy between genetics and Aristotle's sys-
tem has already been probed by the founders of molecular biology
and evolutionary synthesis (Delbrück, 1971; Mayr, 1982; Mauron,
2002; Vinci and Robert, 2005) without their considering it a prob-
lem: the fact that biology uses Aristotelian concepts would only go
on to show the relevance of his system. In actual fact, this theoret-
ical structure induces contradictions which undermine the develop-
ment of the molecular biology research programme.
Indeed, this Aristotelian conception of molecular biology is
nowadays invalidated by the most recent observations. Contrary to
what it predicts, there is very great molecular disorder in biologi-
cal systems. Gene expression and interactions between proteins are
not rigidly determined, but rather the reverse — they have a fun-
damentally probabilistic character. Cellular Darwinism goes beyond
this contradiction because it takes physical and chemical proba-
bilistic laws fully on board. The behaviour of proteins is subjected
to Brownian motion and the laws of diffusion. It does not there-
fore, as does genetics, introduce a difference in kind between physics
and biology. In this respect it is different again from theories of
self-organisation which, like molecular biology, consider order to
be real.
4
i.e. in the knowing subject.
5
i.e. constituting that which is real, inherent in the world, irrespective of the
knowing subject.
