Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
relatively complex frameworks in very different commercial settings. Those ques-
tions include the following:
There are signi
cant costs associated with system administration and transac-
tions (which may be avoided with other schemes). The transaction costs in the
British system are estimated to account for 18 % of the total. In the case of
Denmark, the transaction costs payable by obligated distributors represent about
15 % of the total. However, the lack of transparency as regards implementation
and administration costs is noteworthy.
In general, they are not designed to implement those measures which are most
cost-effective, most ef
”
requirement, but rather only those that provide the most credit or the most
certi
cient, or even those that meet
the
“
additionality
cates. This is a critique that has been made regarding all the schemes of
this type set up in Europe, and it was the main reason behind the recent review
of the British scheme.
They are associated with a high degree of regulatory intervention. In fact, all the
systems set up in Europe have been the object of frequent reviews during their
validity period, with the consequent regulatory risk for investors.
In many cases the gains in ef
ciency derived from the trading of savings are not
leveraged. One of the virtues usually associated with obligations of this kind is
the possibility that they may be traded in order to reduce the cost of compliance.
However, international experience indicates that only in Italy have the possi-
bilities for exchange been properly leveraged (elsewhere stakeholders have
shown an inward-looking self-supply strategy).
There are doubts as to the structural results that can be obtained from these
frameworks and as to a possible rebound effect. The frameworks do not act on
consumer behaviour (only on that of the energy supplier or distributor), which
means that if energy becomes cheaper as a result of savings measures higher
energy consumption may result.
A very signi
cant portion of the potential for savings cannot be realised. The
fact that the transport sector is excluded from most such frameworks means that
opportunities for savings are wasted in a sector that often accounts for around
40 % of energy consumption.
The structure of these frameworks may have a negative effect on equity. In
general, consumers affected by energy poverty have no possibility of saving, so
although the costs of implementing the measures are paid out of the tariffs
charged to all consumers, only those that have the possibility of reducing their
consumption can bene
t from them.
5.4 Proposals
No energy ef
ciency policy can work if the price signals received by consumers are
distorted. This is the conclusion reached in most studies that analyse energy
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