The United States - Comparing Environmental Policies in 16 Countries - page 31

in Olympic National Park in the Pacific Northwest to protest a roadway
planned for the area.
At the time, one of the first converts to the movement was Richard
Nixon. Although he had no personal devotion to the environment, Nixon
realized that the rallies offered a partisan political advantage to the Repub-
licans. Demonstrations like Earth Day were better than demonstrations
against the war in Vietnam, which was going badly. Moreover, protection
of nature fit logically with the values of middle-class members of the
Republican Party.
The president had favored NEPA, and now lent his support to a bill in
Congress that became the Clean Air Act. Earlier laws directing the Public
Health Service (and later the Air Pollution Control Administration) to
conduct research and set standards for the states and cities now seemed
inadequate. But what was to be the next step? Muskie had advocated leav-
ing most of the authority at the state level, but Nixon suggested the national
level do more. Rather than appear to be weak on the subject, Muskie then
proposed the national government do more. Nixon in turn talked about
even more authority for the national level. Both politicians were looking
forward to the 1972 presidential election. Nixon, of course, intended to
run for reelection on the Republican side. In the Democratic Party, Muskie
had his own ambitions. He was nationally prominent, having served in the
Senate for 12 years, and having been his party's nominee for vice president
in 1968. The two men dueled over the provisions of the bill, each seeking
credit as the one most in favor of clean air.
Besides the question of national versus state authority, another issue
was technical—the catalytic converter for automobiles. The engineering
was under development. The Big Three automobile manufacturers argued
that they could not be expected to install a device that was barely invented.
Some companies, however, wanted converters to be mandatory. The
Corning Glass company, which manufactured the components, saw this
as a source of future profits and established a lobbying office in Washing-
ton. Muskie's opinion (which eventually prevailed) was that the law would
require them at a future date, and this would give the auto industry the time
to perfect them. He called the process “technology forcing.” Ironically, the
Japanese auto manufacturers were able to meet the deadlines and the Big
Three were not. Congress extended the deadlines to mollify the American
manufacturers. Muskie was not surprised that the time had to be extended
but wanted to be sure the law gave that responsibility to Congress rather