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intentions to non-humans, even though it may sometimes seem desirable as a
narrative strategy (and Latour [1996] evidently feels this to be a valuable tactic with
respect to Aramis). Callon's (1986) celebrated study refrains from going so far as
imputing intentions to scallops; instead, he argues that the scientists' goals are to
enrol the scallops within a network, but that ultimately the scallops impede these
moves. He thereby adopts a similar line to Pickering (1995:17), who argues that in
studying scientific practice, organised around specific plans and goals, there
is
a need
to have knowledge of the scientists' intentions but
not
necessarily to have insight
into the intentions of things.
Yet, we would also caution that the criticism of anthropomorphism is not as self-
evidently correct as it might first appear. First, we could go some way with Latour's
semiotic method and his assertions that, rather than talking of anthropomorphisms,
we should be talking of many different possible 'morphisms', whether these be
technomorphisms, zoomorphisms or whatever. The claim is that the term
'anthropomorphism' actually 'underestimates our humanity,' in that the
'anthropos'
and the
'morphos'
together mean both that which has human shape and that which
gives shape to humans (Latour 1992:235; 1993:137). People thus give form to non-
humans, but are themselves acted upon and given form by non-humans, in part
through the effects of other 'morphisms' which enlarge the imaginative resources
available to humans for conceptualising their own humanity. Second, we may argue
against the critique of anthropomorphism from a more
Verstehende
approach. The
basic logic to the anthropomorphism critique is that a category mistake is occurring
because humans are radically different from animals (Fisher 1996:4), and that to
portray the latter in terms of the former is to misrepresent their quite different 'true
nature', and thus to foster woeful misunderstandings of what they, the animals, are
really about. Yet, if the possibility is entertained that humans and animals may
not
be so completely different after all, as has been proposed on the basis of alternative
cultural worldviews, scientific findings and even ANT, then the logical grounding
for the charge of anthropomorphism becomes much more rickety. The option is
instead raised of a measured, hesitant and reflected-upon form of
anthropomorphism, one whose self-critical proclivities would prevent the excesses of
a Glenwood Clark, but one which would allow the possibility of insights to be
produced from considering
some
non-humans in
some
situations
as if
they could
perceive, feel, emote, make decisions and perhaps even 'reason' something like a
human being. In addition, this position rebounds back on the hard
anthropocentrism of the standard anthropomorphism critique, given that, from its
determinedly human-referenced starting-point, it implies that there are no
continuities between humans and non-humans (animals included) and thereby no
basis for us (humans) sharing anything with other beings in the world. Humans are
effectively sealed off from the rest of creation by such a vision, and in the process
prioritised as the only beings genuinely able both to enjoy and to suffer their
worldly lot. Such an aggressive anthropocentrism undermines any basis for a more
inclusive 'politics', an imagining that Elder, Wolch and Emel (1998a, 1998b) term
the
'pratique sauvage'
, which might allow humans to make common cause with
