Geoscience Reference
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indeed, through scientific knowledge (Latour 1993). Moreover, Latour describes
how modernist discourse attempts to order these differing forms of representation—
humans are represented through political representation ('speaking for'); non-
humans are represented through scientific representation. Science is hence given the
responsibility of constructing representations of non-humans which can inform
rational decision-making, with any other form of representation of non-humans
being dismissed as irrational.
Yet the process of representation itself—of either type—is complex and therefore
open to contestation. Most significantly, representation is not just a
re-presentation
—
the reproduction of an object in the same form in another arena—but a
translation,
such that an object cannot be represented without taking on a new form. Politicians
translate the agency of citizens into the power of authority; scientists translate the
objects they study into matrices of scientific knowledge. In both cases the process of
representation gives voice to those who represent, and silences those who are
represented (Latour 1993).
The significance of translation is three-fold. First it gives objects a mobility which
is both physical and metaphorical. Thus a fox, photographically captured in its
natural environment, can be transported in the form of a photographic image into
other arenas such as newspaper advertisements. Photographs, cinematic film, video
tapes, scientific reports, statistics, anecdotal stories, all become 'immutable mobiles'
(Latour 1990) that allow political debate to take place by presenting to decision-
makers convincing representations of things which they have not directly
experienced. Second, as the translation of an object into an immutable mobile
necessarily detaches the subject from its representation, so the subject and
representation must be treated as different entities. In translation the subject loses
control over its representation, such that the representation must be read as the
product of the actor(s) responsible for its construction and mobilisation. Third, as
the subject is detached from its representation, so the subject assumes the possibility
of dissenting against its representation (see Callon 1986).
This chapter discusses the representation of two animals—the fox and the deer—
in the debate about hunting provoked by the Foster Bill in 1997. It outlines three
conflicting representations—those of sporting foe, pest and victim—and explores
how the animals were translated into each of these representations, and how the
process of translation and representation creates opportunities for those
representations to be challenged. As claims to scientific knowledge feature
prominently in these stories, the chapter then briefly considers the problematic of
scientific representation, focusing on the political contestation of the Bateson
Report into the effects of hunting on deer.
Take 1—cunning Reynard: the fox as a sporting foe
One of the traditional representations of the fox mobilised in hunting discourse is
that of the fox as an equal and cunning contestant. The elevation of hunting from a
mere functional activity to the status of a sport relies on the representation of the