Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
representation, to make their nation-state (and hence their sovereignty and border con-
trol) border animated, bodily present, and potent. But, increasingly, the animalisation of
the state is extended to migrants who are to be seen as wild or untamed animals that run
and need to be stopped by quick and potent border guard predators of the state. Illus-
tratively, often one reads or hears about the cat and mouse game between border guards
and irregular migrants. And along the U.S.-Mexico border one often hears the terms
coyotes or
polleros
(the smugglers) and pollos (the undocumented migrants), and along
the Chinese borders the term
shetou
(snakehead) is commonly used to typify migration
brokers and smugglers. Hence though not new, the EU's use of RABITs is no less sar-
castic and worrying.
As of 2004, FRONTEX has been employing various boats, helicopters, and planes
coming from various EU members in the Mediterranean and along the northern and
western African coast to prevent boats with migrants from entering into the territorial
waters of the EU, creating a whole new EU-landscape of defence and fences (see also
Carrera, 2007b). What is more, the detection phase of the border machine that has been
developed has increasingly become a lethal phase. Over the years, as the securitisation
and patrolling of the border control has grown, attempts to remain unseen or to escape
from border guards has led to the death of many would-be immigrants who are trying to
get into the EU. Obviously, the closing of the gate has not stopped migrants from com-
ing. It has only made it more dangerous. In the words of Bauman (2002b, 85):
The doors may be locked; but the problem won't go away, however tight the
locks. Locks do nothing to tame or weaken the forces that cause displacement
and make humans into refugees. The locks may help to keep the problem out of
sight and out of mind, but not to force it out of existence.
With the construction of a gated isle of wealth, and with the conscious denial of reg-
ular access to citizens from 135 countries, the EU widens the gap globally and regu-
lates mortality of people on a global scale. It produces a segment of the world popu-
lation willing to risk their lives to get into the EU. Hideously, the deaths of those who
do try to cross the border without permission are implicitly seen as the “collateral dam-
age” of a combat against irregular migration (Albahari 2006; Bauman 2004). Illustrat-
ively, neither the number of deaths nor their names or cause of death is even counted or
registered officially (see also Spijkerboer 2007). They are made absent, unrepresented,
and invisible. As a protest of this silencing the deaths of undocumented migrants who
have died in their attempt to get into or stay in the EU, the counting of the number of
“deaths at the border” is done by alternative organisations, like United Against Racism
and No Borders. Rough estimates indicate that the number of deaths is somewhere in
the 13,000s now (see
Figure 7.3
)
. Other sources, however, speak of many more deaths,
