Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
markets, giving rise to an increase in foreign market competition and under-
mining the domestic cash cow conditions that enabled Japanese irms to
reduce prices overseas.
Unfortunately, even though conditions have changed, the industrial devel-
opment policy embraced by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
(METI) has not evolved to keep pace. he focus on implementing policies
that will help industry to reduce the cost of factors of production is still a
dominant pillar in METI industrial policy when actually what is needed is a
transformation of industry both technologically and operationally.
he custom of setting policy to exploit current realities rather than future
trends has had a major impact on the evolution of Japan's energy sector.
METI—and by proxy the Japanese government—supports energy tech-
nologies that are currently the most cost efective. In the past that meant
that coal, liquid natural gas (LNG), nuclear power, and hydropower were the
preferred energy sources. Consequently, the nation has nurtured the devel-
opment of energy infrastructure that is designed to optimize contributions
from these technologies. Although wind power has now achieved a degree
of commercialization that in most countries makes it preferable to nuclear
power and LNG, the Japanese government does not perceive this to be the
case for Japan because the conditions under which electricity technology
costs are compared are biased toward the incumbent technologies. his will
be discussed further in section 9.5.3.
9.4.3 Technological Landscape
Technologically, Japan's nuclear regime is as well entrenched as any nuclear
regime in the world. It has historically enjoyed strong political support, ben-
eited signiicantly from government funding, and has been insulated from
public and media scrutiny.
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here is a strong sense that the nuclear power regime is biding its time,
waiting for public opposition to diminish. In order to facilitate this the gov-
ernment has been very quick to publically reorganize its nuclear safety regime
and bolster regulatory oversight.
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Concurrently, it has quietly allowed a cou-
ple of nuclear power construction projects and uranium reprocessing plans to
proceed. It is widely accepted in all circles that the 0% nuclear power option
that was one of the three alternatives under study by the government is not
really viewed as a feasible alternative. Moreover, even the 15 to 25% nuclear
power option has been heavily criticized by industry supporters as unrealistic
and uneconomical. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is supportive of a full
return to a nuclear powered energy policy.
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