Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
gone so far as to declare nuclear power to be a domestic energy resource,
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despite Japan having no uranium deposits to speak of. his domestic per-
spective is derived from the fact that the nation has embraced a closed-cycle
strategy to nuclear power development which, if achieved, would allow the
nation to reprocess existing stockpiles of spent nuclear fuel.
Given the evident desire of Japan's energy policymakers to enhance domes-
tic energy security and reduce carbon emissions, it begs the question of why
the nation has neglected the development of renewable power technologies
for electricity generation. Part of the explanation rests with the historical cost
legacy of electricity generated by renewable technologies. Simply put, Japan's
industrial lobby, which has a very strong inluence on policymaking, has been
opposed to high contributions from renewable energy out of concern that the
added cost will undermine industrial competitiveness.
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his is not to say that the Japanese government has neglected the commer-
cial promise of renewable energy. Immediately after the irst oil crisis in 1973,
the Japanese government ramped up its funding for renewable energy R&D. By
the end of the 1970s, with oil still at inlated prices, the Japanese government
ampliied its support for renewable energy R&D (see Figure 9.4). Geothermal
technology received priority funding because even in the early years, the cost
proile of geothermal power and the untapped potential in the nation made
it an obvious alternative energy technology to pursue commercially. By the
1990s, concerns over the adverse impacts of wide-scale expansion of geother-
mal plans on Japan's onsen industry had stymied utility-scale adoption.
Although the economics of solar technologies did not justify support for
domestic use, solar power was embraced in the early 1980s as an enabling
technology for existing (i.e., solar cells for electronics) and new (i.e., solar
photovoltaic technology) industrial sectors. Meanwhile, support for wind
power R&D was negligible, due to a belief that there was limited realizable
potential in Japan for wind power.
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In absolute terms, the data from Figure 9.4, which shows that the
Japanese government spent between US$100-200 million on renewable
energy R&D between 1980 and 2000, appears to indicate a sizable commit-
ment until it is compared to the investment made in nuclear power R&D.
Figure 9.5 contrasts R&D investment in renewable energy to other energy
technologies, particularly nuclear power. As the data demonstrates, the
amount of support provided to renewable energy R&D was a mere sliver of
the amount that went to nuclear power development.
As described in the introduction, on March 11, 2011, the relatively
uncontested ascent of nuclear power in Japan ended. As a result of the
Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan has now shut down all of its nuclear reac-
tors (although two units have been allowed to operate for a period of time).
