Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
prices of the 1970s that there was widespread industrial support for diver-
sifying the energy mix even if it came at a slightly elevated cost.
58
For this
reason, industries were far from threatened by the prospect of 5% or 10% of
Germany's electricity supply coming from wind power—a domestic source
which exhibited low variable costs. To the contrary, there was general sup-
port for limited diversiication. Similarly, although there was always a
degree of opposition to wind power stemming from technological concerns,
government policies allowing additional costs to be passed through to con-
sumers tended to dampen what would normally be higher levels of utility
opposition. Additionally, many of Germany's smaller local utilities were
community-owned, and as such they were much more receptive to environ-
mentally favorable initiatives (such as renewable energy development) that
were in the public interest.
59
In striking contrast to the tepid opposition to wind power shown by
energy-intensive industries and large utilities, there were two stakeholder
groups that beneited inancially from wind power development and were,
therefore, ebullient advocates of wind power. First, there were a myriad
of citizens that individually or in small limited partnerships were invest-
ing in wind power developments. Not only were the returns attractive for
these investors, the investment was tax deductible. herefore, investors
were well-motivated to proactively campaign for sustained political sup-
port.
60
Second, German wind turbine manufacturers were represented by
the Federal Wind Association, which has proven to be exacting and efective
in political circles.
61
In the early days, the blossoming wind power market bore no real drama.
Proactive, proponents of wind power fueled public and political support,
while opposition from major industries and large utilities remained muted.
As outlined earlier, it wasn't until about 1997, when installed national wind
power capacity reached 2000 MW, that the utilities banded together to
publicly oppose further wind power development by challenging the gov-
ernment's renewable energy act as contradicting EU market liberalization
regulations. By then, a major justiication for opposition (higher costs) had
disappeared. Between 1990 and 2000, competition in Germany's vibrant
wind power market had stimulated technological progress;
62
consequently,
the cost of wind power decreased by about 30%, signiicantly attenuating
cost concerns that industries harbored.
63
With wind power prices reaching a
level of competitive viability (thanks in part to the presence of green taxes),
the only hope that utilities had for successful opposition was that public
dissonance associated with aesthetic impairments to Germany's landscape
would prompt a reversal of public support. his has yet to materialize, and
so utilities have had to reluctantly accept the challenge of trying to incorpo-
rate ever increasing grid contributions from wind power.
