Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
energy systems rather than the development of speciic technologies.
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hese minor concessions would prove to be insuicient for reinvigorating
the lagging wind power market. As Table 4.4 illustrates, between 2005 and
2007, there was actually net zero growth in wind power capacity. However,
thanks to other government initiatives to improve energy eiciency and
reduce demand, the contribution of wind power to Denmark's electricity
grid actually rose to 19.7% in 2007 (from 18.5% in 2004).
Given the fact that virtually no wind power development occurred between
2004 and 2007, it is easy to understand why critics felt justiied in intimat-
ing that the Rasmussen administration's wind power policy was damaging to
the industry.
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However, in hindsight, this developmental lull was perhaps
necessary in order to rein in excessive subsidies and reengineer Denmark's
grid for bolder renewable energy initiatives in years to come. By 2004, wind
power's share of domestic electricity production had actually risen to 18.5%,
compared to 12.1% in 2001 (see Figure 4.8). Not only had this resulted in
Denmark's electricity consumers paying substantially higher prices for elec-
tricity (in comparison to neighboring EU countries), but there were ampliied
concerns that integration of such high levels of wind power was producing
oversupply during certain periods which had to of-loaded to the Nord Pool
market at a heavy loss. Moreover, claims that the new policies were threaten-
ing the commercial viability of the wind power manufacturing sector may
have been more emotive than logical because 90% of the revenues earned by
Danish wind power irms were from export sales.
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here is little evidence to support the contention that the Rasmussen admin-
istration was opposed to renewable energy. Indeed, the overall contribution of
renewable energy to Denmark's electricity supply continued to increase under
the Rasmussen administration's policies. his was partly due to enhanced sup-
port for ledgling renewable energy technologies that the government truly felt
needed government support. For example, a subsidy was announced for biogas
that would provide €0.08 per kWh as a FIT for 10 years and €0.05 per kWh for
the subsequent 10 years. Other subsidies were announced to support special
plants using energy sources or technologies of major importance to the future
exploitation of renewable energy, such as wave power, fuel cells, solar energy
and biomass.
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In fact, evidence suggests that the government was proactively
engaged in initiatives designed to avert some of the technical barriers to further
wind power development. For example, in 2005 the Danish government, in
adhering to terms of an EU agreement to liberalize electricity markets in order to
support further renewable energy difusion, initiated a major restructuring. East
and West transmission networks were merged under the management of a new
state-owned grid operator, Energinet Danmark. Energinet Danmark was also
appointed to oversee operation of the nation's gas network, an initiative that
