Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
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How can we involve local people in monitoring, as a step towards locally based
participatory management of natural resources, that in the long term is sus-
tainable without external intervention?
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And the holy grail—can we combine the three points above, to get simple,
cheap, scientifically robust, locally sustainable participatory monitoring that
detects trends and at the same time promotes compliance?
In Chapter 6, we discussed the philosophical underpinnings and keys to success
when setting and enforcing rules. Here we look at successful implementation of
monitoring in order to ensure compliance with these rules. Enforcement and
compliance with rules are emotive issues. The term 'poacher' is pejorative, and is
not always appropriate, particularly when discussing local people using resources
to which they feel they have rights. At the other extreme, poaching of high-value
products is likely to be difficult to discuss openly with anyone involved, and offers
the temptation for corruption among officials at all levels. Hence, this is a difficult
subject about which to obtain validated and transparent information. It is also
important to bear in mind that researchers, managers and local people can be
placed in personal danger through persevering with enforcing rules.
In Protected Areas, monitoring is likely to be done by park rangers employed by
the government, with sanctions applied based on legislation and through the
courts. In community-based conservation initiatives, monitoring is usually done
by the local people, and traditional systems of sanctions may be used. Alternatively,
violators may face the withdrawal of privileges granted by the community or by an
external NGO. In all cases there are some key principles for success:
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People respond to
perceived
risks of detection, capture and punishment
(Box 3.2). This means that publicity is crucial whenever someone is caught,
and that monitoring should be high profile. It is also no good detecting people
if they subsequently go unpunished; this can be difficult to do anything about,
because the authorities which administer punishment are often not the wildlife
authorities, and may feel differently about the importance of the offence.
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As Jachmann and Billiouw (1997) demonstrated in the Luangwa Valley (Box
6.2),
following up leads
and working with local people to find out about
rule-breaking can be more cost-effective than simply patrolling the protected
area. The Wildlife Preservation Society of India has a similar approach to mon-
itoring and publicising wildlife crime (WPSI n.d.).
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Monitoring need not necessarily be focused only on protecting species
in situ
.
Targeting bottlenecks
in the commodity chain, such as key traders, can be
much more effective.
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Monitoring must continue
even when poaching appears not to be occur-
ring. If monitoring stops, then there is no incentive for people to continue
abiding by the rules.
