Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
similar to that required for other kinds of intervention. An analysis of the costs
involved in the Australian conservation auction pilot scheme suggested that,
although initial set-up costs were high, overall the scheme was 2-3 times more
efficient than the alternative of paying a fixed price for a given conservation service
regardless of the costs that farmers actually incurred (Gole
et al
. 2005). The
proponents of direct payments state that they are flexible, efficient, explicit about
the reasons behind the intervention, and so are simple to understand. Opponents
are concerned for a number of reasons (Romero and Andrade 2004). They worry
about
commercialising
nature by introducing market mechanisms when nature is
so hard to value, and possibly weakening other, non-use values for nature. They are
concerned about the
power asymmetry
that exists in the negotiations between local
people and international conservation organisations. This means that local people
may not get a fair price for their conservation services and may lose their rights, and
that direct payments schemes may not help to build local
social capital
(such as
community groups or education) and empower people to improve their livelihoods
through engaging them in rural development. ICDPs and sustainable use schemes
have the advantage that they explicitly aim to build local institutions, which will then
have a knock-on effect on community empowerment more generally.
The issue about underpaying comes down to whether schemes pay people's
opportunity costs
for conservation, or pass on the benefits from conservation that
outsiders receive. Opportunity costs can be relatively low in poor areas and com-
paratively easy to quantify, whereas the values of nature are likely to be both large
and very hard to monetise. However, it seems likely that any conservation inter-
vention will only pay what is needed to conserve wildlife, rather than investing at
a level reflecting true global biodiversity value, so again the issue is whether direct
payments are just making this inequity explicit. There is also no reason why direct
payments can't improve social institutions and empower local people if they are
well implemented (Durbin 2003).
The four approaches discussed here all have strengths and weaknesses, which make
them more or less suitable to particular circumstances. Referring back to the data
requirements discussed in Part 6.1, we can suggest when each approach is most
appropriate.
Regulated use
requires a resilient and productive species, providing a marketable
product. Success is more likely if revenues can be generated quickly and monitoring
is relatively cheap. There is a need for stable and well-developed institutional struc-
tures, such as a resource users' association, that can implement the management
plan. Few species of conservation concern meet these requirements, although it
may be possible to use an umbrella species and conserve the other species that share
its habitat.
Alternatives
require realistic robust livelihood activities that can truly replace
the damaging activity (rather than just supplementing, or even stimulating, it).
