Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
The
keys to success
are:
●
Most critically, there need to be people whose activities influence conserva-
tion success and who are in a position to sign contracts that commit them to
constraints on their behaviour. This generally means that they must have
property rights
over the area of conservation interest. Hence in Costa Rica
and Australia, farmers can sign contracts to manage their land a certain way,
and these are easily monitored and enforced. However, in developing
countries, property rights are not always clear and enforceable. This is not
necessarily an insurmountable obstacle, however. Contracts can be signed
with communities rather than individuals (Durbin 2003), or can include a
commitment to change one's behaviour and influence others, rather than to
guarantee a conservation outcome (Box 6.6).
●
Government backing
is required in order to ensure that conservation contracts
are enforceable in law. This may be difficult to achieve if it involves granting
rights to communities that were not previously present.
●
Agreements should be fairly
negotiated
with local people, and contribute to
building long-term sustainable livelihoods, rather than being seen as a cheap
and quick way of obtaining conservation benefits (Romero and Andrade 2004).
The
framework for analysis
of direct payments for conservation is
market-based
instruments
(MBIs). These have a long history in environmental economics,
having been widely applied in pollution control. The idea there is that individuals
or firms act in an environmentally damaging way because they are not paying the
full costs of their actions—they generate
externalities
which are costs incurred by
people other than the person carrying out the damaging action. Buying a permit
to pollute transfers these costs back to the polluter (Field and Field 1997). Turning
Box 6.6
Conserving snow leopards (
Uncia uncia
) in Mongolia.
The International Snow Leopard Trust (ISLT) has used conservation contracts
successfully. In 1998 they started Snow Leopard Enterprises in Mongolia, where
they enter into a contract with herders to buy woollen handicrafts at fair trade
prices (Figure 6.9). The contract is signed in the autumn, and herders agree not to
poach either snow leopards or their prey. In the spring, when the products are
purchased, they receive a 20% bonus if no poaching incidents have been recorded
in the area. This provides an incentive not just to refrain from poaching them-
selves, but to stop others poaching. In 2003, the scheme covered 50% of the snow
leopard's range in Mongolia, had expanded to Kyrgystan, and there were no
reported poaching incidents. Although this may look superficially like an ICDP-
type approach, the difference is that there is a contract to buy goods, rather than
intervention to set up alternative livelihoods. The direct payment for conservation
is not the purchase of the goods per se, but the bonus scheme.
