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lined the main military routes to Canudos. African techniques of drop traps, spikes, and
hidden entrances further confused the militia as Abbade's men crept to the flanks of the
formations, then trapped the soldiers. The rebels even stole their food. The defeat of the
second expedition was devastating.
This humiliating trouncing was followed by a crescendo of panic as the newspapers
a modern army? It seemed possible only if weaponry and strategy were being supplied
frommonarchistsupporters,eagerforarestorationandinflamedbyreligiousfanaticism.
And perhaps Solon Ribeiro was at fault, a bit “unsound” in his loyalties, since he had
been on the list of less desirables for some time. After this debacle Solon asked for de-
ployment to Pará.
13
Clearly what was required was someone who knew how to put down rebellions and
whose political bona fides were impeccable. This was the military hero Antonio Mor-
eira César, whose Jacobin sympathies and pitiless comportment in war were unassail-
able:hehadcrushedasecessionistuprisinginSantaCaterinawithimplacablecruelty.In
many ways considered the heir to Floriano Peixoto, Moreira César was the commander
of preference for the third strike. His nickname was “Treme Terra”: the earthshaker. He
alsohadamorebrutalmoniker,“TheCut-throat,”forhistasteinsummaryexecutionsof
those who had participated in the Santa Caterina federalist revolt.
The third expedition set out in February 1897 with thirteen hundred men, sixteen mil-
lion rounds of ammunition, and the latest in Krupp cannons. Uninformed of the terrain
or the water availability, and flush with his success in the south, Moreira César and his
battalions soon found themselves in an eerie landscape of ghost horses, buzzards, and
Afro-Indianjuju.DaCunhadescribedMoreiraCésaraserratic,vain,andimpulsive,sug-
gesting that his character flaws might have been due to his epilepsy. Confident of his
soldiers'abilities,MoreiraCésarhadnorespectforwhatheincorrectlyviewedasundis-
ciplined brigands with little military acumen.
Moreira César and his soldiers simply walked into a guerrilla trap. Da Cunha de-
scribed it this way: “Had not the enemy left the road clear for them up to now, failing to
take advantage in the most favorable stretches to attack them? There was but one thing
thatworriedthem:whatiftheyshouldfindthisrebelnestemptywhentheyarrived?This
likely disappointment produced an alarming thought: . . . their inglorious return without
having fired a single cartridge.”
Many, including Moreira César, would have all eternity to ponder their faulty as-
sessments. The campaign proceeded with forced marches through the searing Sertão
with the idea of “lunch in Canudos.” The “Legal” forces—as the government military
came to be known—set up the cannons and began bombarding the town, which essen-
tially produced rubbled palisades that the attacking forces would have to traverse. Ca-
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