Wall Street, Rebels, and Rio Branco - The Scramble for the Amazon and the Lost Paradise of Euclides da Cunha - page 150

al conflicts involved combating the environments and disease as much as the enemies.
While force majeur could ultimately prevail, the locals were implacable, and the formal
armies, if they triumphed, did so at great cost. Bolivia had no large army; the mortal-
ity of Bolivian combatants in the Acre was such that recruitment was quite difficult and
desertion frequent. Nonetheless, General Pando, who clearly preferred to resolve territ-
orial questions by military campaigns rather than palace politics, had lurched off to the
jungles for the last campaign. 38
The Acreans continued their guerrilla war. Rio Branco was well versed in the details
of this particular conflagration as well as its diplomatic antecedents, thanks to his time
in the imperial court when his father was foreign minister and the Ayacucho Treaty had
been signed. A series of private letters from Assis-Brasil had kept Rio Branco abreast of
the Acre imbroglio. The Baron, Assis-Brasil, and John Bassett Moore had decided on a
different means of resolution of the Acre question, even though Brazilian battalions had
their orders and were moving toward the border of Mato Grosso and into Manaus, and
the lands claimed by Bolivia were in the hands of Acrean rebels. Brazil's position was
helped by more general problems in the imperial world. Germany had declined to par-
ticipate in this conflict, and Britain, eyeing the state of affairs in South Africa, seemed
little interested in yet another guerrilla war.
There were three key elements that underpinned the Rio Branco approach in the Acre
and echoed his general diplomatic principles. First, the Treaties of Madrid, Idelfonso,
andAyacuchowouldhavenostandinginthiscontroversy.ThosepactspertainedtoNew
World terrains of the extinct Spanish and Portuguese empires. While the agreements
might provide useful guidance for modern independent nations, in Rio Branco's view
they had no legal sway in modern republics. In any case, Idelfonso had never been rati-
fiedbyPortugal,inpartbecauseofthelackofaboundarysurveyandthefieryenmityof
Iberian rulers held for one another at the time. Thus traditional treaty claims not signed
by the current republics had no validity. Next, uti possedetis de facto and not de jure
would be the most powerful claim for disputed territory. And finally, Rio Branco would
negotiate only bilaterally. Three-way diplomacy would require that Brazil give up signi-
ficant territorial concessions, which it was not interested in doing with Bolivia or Peru.
The boundary questions of Peru and Bolivia would be taken up separately.
At issue, as we have seen, was the legality of Bolivia's right to transact terrains
with undefined boundaries. As the region had become more contentious and militarized,
Bolivia and Peru agreed to submit to arbitration by the president of Argentina, José
Figueroa Alcorta, and in December 1902 an agreement was signed in La Paz. Bolivia
wouldbethestalkinghorseforBrazil'sinterests,withtheBolivianpositionarguedinda
Cunha's Peru versus Bolivia ,whileRioBrancowouldnegotiatedirectlyandinsequence