Operationalising Adaptive Capacity - Climate Change and Water Governance: Adaptive Capacity in Chile and Switzerland - page 245

Table 12.3 (continue d)

Case example
Chile Network indicators Operationalisation Switzerland

Power & Balance :
Institutional power
relationships, complex-
ity of institutional
relationships; power
imbalances/relation-
ships between different
sectors/economic
groups/ministries.

Media and press articles used to influence
decision making on rights allocation and the
Aconcagua project; rights administration
disagreements between DOH & irrigators and
the DGA; power struggles between CNR and
MOP, DOH and DGA, DGA and MMA
reduces efficacy of coordination and roles -
relationship changes from one administration
to the next; strength and independence of
powerful economic actors, and their
infiltration into political, academic and
judicial decision making.

Shifting roles and responsibilities across private
and public spaces (in agriculture to public and
in flood defence to private) according to
diminishing and rising capacity; competing
policy priorities across sectors (e.g. micro-
hydropower versus environmental flows
provisions) with no overview or integration
into TRC; agricultural and hydropower
stakeholders at odds against the ecologicalisa-
tion of water management at canton and federal
levels; communes are independent and
autonomous from canton and federal adminis-
trations, but are subject to canton and federal
laws, and reliant on subsidies and support.

Levels of decision
making

Administrative Authority :
Relative authority at
different administrative
levels; level of
centralisation or
decentralisation.

Centralist government with high degree of
Presidential powers and priority setting (e.g.
Presidential decision required on projects,
drought declaration etc.); Presidential
interventions on project approval; regional
branches (operational level) of ministries
handcuffed by planning and policy decisions
by national bodies (political level) and
planning offices (MIDEPLAN) in Santiago
(seen as 'King'), with lack of effective
feedback mechanism between central and
regional authorities; Courts have authority to
define precedents in the implementation of the
Water Code, thereby retain a powerful role in
water 'management'; canal and JdV actors

Decentralised system of federalism, with role of
implementation at canton level, and in the
Valais, the communes are particularly
autonomous; subsidies for following ecological
and security priorities of the 2001 Federal
Directive for watercourse management is key
for balancing the autonomy of decision making
at the commune level (subsidised up to 95 %
for Gefahrenkarte, ZonenPlan, Bauzone etc)
enabling canton and federal environmental
agencies to ensuring the implementation of
priority policies and concepts; canton
administrations are responsible for sectoral
coordination and support, but communes for