Bridges and Barriers to Adaptive Capacity - Climate Change and Water Governance: Adaptive Capacity in Chile and Switzerland - page 205

Table 11.1 (c ontinued)

Major barriers and bridges to adaptation: Chile
Barriers Scale Bridges

Institutional informality (i.e. there may or may not be a Junta de
Vigilancia, it may or may not function properly/be legalised,
there may or may not be cooperation between the different
Juntas) heightens upstream - downstream rivalries and can
lead to unproportional distribution - power imbalances and
lack of cooperation reduce the ability to find user based
solutions where there are not major winners and losers (and
everyone losing in the end) - reducing resilience of the SES
in general

Informal legal situation of Juntas can lead to more incentive to
cooperate with other Juntas in order to avoid conflict,
though in the long run this is not necessarily an option.
Individual user groups do have incentives to cooperate (mining,
hydropower and agriculture); additionally, actors across the
different Junta de Vigilancia see it in their interests to
negotiate and cooperate with the Juntas further upstream
and downstream - the aim is to avoid conflict since as
entrepreneurs, they see it in their interest to invest in
efficiency and good relationships

Strong adversity against charging for water/economic incentives
for increased efficiency and conservation (not just to increase
efficiency then exploit more)
Privately negotiated agreements and informal collaborations and
negotiations are vulnerable to inconsistencies and renege-
ments leading to high mistrust amongst user groups and a
lack of confidence in agreements settled on - yet these are
one of the key adaptive actions!
Lack of investment and resources to pay for infrastructure
maintenance at canal user level meaning water losses
exacerbate drought impacts; additionally, farmers are
expanding plantation areas, without having sufficient rights,
aggravated by losses in the canals themselves