Water Governance in the Context of IWRM: Chile - Climate Change and Water Governance: Adaptive Capacity in Chile and Switzerland - page 144

clarity and oversight on the DGA's part on the trading and transactions of water
rights. Stakeholders also alluded to the lack of transparency in decisions and data
from Conservador or even judges, in terms of the information that judicial decision
making was based on.
Criticism was also directed at the lack of regular monitoring and assessment of
water quality and quantity (which are carried out by MMA and DGA respectively),
as well as at challenges arising from a lack of impartiality and objectivity in research
and monitoring studies to provide accurate scientific information upon which to
base decisions. It has been estimated that over two thirds of water rights are
based on the return flow of other rights in the upper watersheds (Pena 1997, 2001 ) .
In areas of the country such as the Copiapo, the legal over exploitation of ground-
water has reached 18,000,000 m 3 per year (MMA, Expert). Again, this issue can
partly be assigned to the DGA, which set a very wet period (just 1 year as opposed
to a longer time period) when water availability was high as the baseline from which
to calculate abstraction levels (MMA, Expert), meaning that abstraction levels are
simply too high for more recurrent dry periods.

8.2.3 Participation

Article 4 of the Environmental Law requires the State to facilitate public participation,
access to environmental information and promote educational campaigns to protect
the environment. Article 186 of the Water Code provides for the establishment of
water user communities (Junta de Vigilancia) where more than two rights owners
share the same watercourse. However, while the deregulated approach places water
management in the hands of the water rights owners, participation in the broader
issues that affect water resources in the basin is very limited. The EIA has been the
principle mechanism since 1997 through which public participation is envisaged, with
the MMA and its regional agencies responsible for its implementation (Environmental
Law, Art, 4). However, many authors have criticised the EIA in the Chilean deregu-
lated neoliberal model because a meaningful enforcement power of provisions for the
process is practically non-existent (Carruthers 2001 ). In reality it has been seen to
have been used as a pre-emptive tool to demobilize conflict and local opposition to
mega projects, such as controversial hydro-electric projects (Bio Bio, Baker), and has
been described as 'inherently cautious and exclusionary where environmental con-
cerns might challenge economic priorities' (Carruthers 2001 , p 350).
After decades of citizen exclusion from public debate and destruction of Chilean
social fabric, citizen culture is returning. There is now a growing movement of
activism and unrest on issues related to environmental and social injustices, as well
as a growing consensus that there is a need for a new constitution, that enables a
fairer balance of power between citizens and corporations (see Guardian 2011 ;
Patagonia 2011 ; Nacion 2010 ). More recently, a new public participation law has
been brought into effect (Law N° 20.500), that provides for broader public partici-
pation than just the EIA through the right of the people to participate in policies,