Environmental Engineering Reference
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outside the reserve. If, on the other hand, the member is detected (D)
she or he will carry the cost of the i ne (− F ) with probability a. If the
member does not trespass she or he will remain under status quo (SQ)
conditions.
Let us derive the expected probabilities for the unique decision node for
the members of the reserve adjacent community:
Ep (t) 5 a (− F ) 1 (1 − a) B 5 −a F 1 B − a B 5 −a ( F 1 B ) 1 B
Ep (~t) 5 0
Thus, for not trespassing to be a preferred strategy either:
(1) a . B / ( F 1 B ) or
(2) F . B (1 − a) / a or
(3) B , a F / (1 − a)
From the previous set of equations, there are four ways of making not
trespassing to be a preferred strategy. These are either to:
increase the probability of getting caught to the level shown in the
equation; or
increase the level of the i ne to the level shown in the equation; or
decrease the level of benei ts to the level shown in the equation; or
a combination.
The use of game theory is not a substitute for assessing side-ef ects from
each of the available strategies. These can be built up in other rounds of
the game or subsequent games. Possible side-ef ects from each of these
policy options are, for example, increasing the probability of getting
caught would mean having to invest more resources in monitoring activi-
ties, increasing the level of the i ne might foster corruption and so on. The
usefulness of this example rests in illustrating a situation to identify the
key variables shaping a decision and their levels.
Let us now consider that complete exclusion is not the only scenario
into which reserve adjacent communities can be put. The state, or the
managers of the reserve, could have a continuum of possibilities ranging
from uncontrolled access to total exclusion (Figure 10.12).
Merging Figure 10.11 and 10.12, we could construct a game with
two players: the state (or managers of the reserve) and reserve-adjacent
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