Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
D
0,0
D
C
~A
11,-1
-1,-11
D
C
~A
C
10,10
0,0
D
D
C
*
e
< 20
11,-1
-1,11
A
D
C
C
10,10
0,0
1
2
1
2
D
D
C
~A
11,-1
-1,11
D
C
C
10,10
10 -
A
A
e
/2, 10 -
e
/2
Source:
Ostrom (1990, p. 15).
Figure 10.8
Example of a self-i nanced contract enforcement game
variables that can enhance cooperation and for assessing the viability and
desirability of policy options using examples from common pool resource
management in semi-arid Tanzania.
Worked examples from semi-arid Tanzania
Much of the Tanzanian land area is still under open access or some form
of common property or management arrangement (Quinn and Ockwell,
Chapter 9, this volume).
Two dif erent problems will be taken as examples to illustrate the use
of game theory for understanding decision-making processes and assess-
ing the viability and desirability of policy options in the management of
common pool resources. The i rst will be the problems encountered by vil-
lages that face soil erosion on communally managed land. The second will
be the problems faced by communities living next to wildlife conservation
reserves and who are prevented from using resources within the reserve.
Erosion prevention/restoration and cooperation in common pool scenarios
Semi-arid ecosystems are characterized by highly variable rainfall pat-
terns, such as short, intense storms, and high evapotranspiration rates.
In several areas of semi-arid Tanzania, there are serious problems of land
