Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Player 2
C
D
a
c
C
*
a
c
Player 1
c
d
D
*
b
d
Source:
Adapted from Ostrom et al. (1994).
Figure 10.6
Adaptation of the chicken game (c > a, c > d and b > d)
for the group as a whole. If both locations are equally good (Figure 10.6),
players will be indif erent and will play a mixed strategy leading either to
one (C,D) or the other equilibrium (D,C).
Due to the attributes of CPRs, individuals jointly using CPRs are many
times stuck in a dilemma. Without previous communication and the lack
of institutions (norms and conventions), agents pursuing their own inter-
ests will engage in non-rational collective outcomes that result in resource
degradation. Institutional choice theorists have focused on identifying
viable institutional alternatives by which appropriators of the CPR can
choose (1) how much, when, where and with what technology to withdraw
units and (2) how much, when and where to invest in the maintenance
of the CPR (Ostrom et al., 1994). The next section outlines the game-
theoretic logic for such viable institutional solutions.
Institutional solutions to CPR problems
While the use of the prisoner's dilemma game was for many years mistak-
enly applied to represent all CPR situations (for a critic see Ostrom, 1990;
Ostrom et al., 1994), as mentioned in the previous section, it can be very
useful for illustrating appropriation and provision problems encountered
when managing CPRs.
Consider the prisoner's dilemma game again, now in the extensive form,
with the payof s thought out by Dawes (1973). As we have seen, the pris-
oner's dilemma structure games have a unique Nash equilibium which is
(D,D). The game in Figure 10.7 depicts this equilibrium in a square with
the resulting payof s of 0,0 respectively.
