Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
cases other actors such as NGOs are involved in this process. However,
verii cation is still mainly dependent on national reports, which might
be unreliable or even false especially when national interests are at stake.
Hence, practically, it could be the case that compliance is not achieved
even if reporting indicates to the contrary. Furthermore, it is crucial to
properly set the standards against which compliance will be measured so
as to be meaningful (Ausubel and Victor, 1992). Only recently have studies
paid attention to the issue of compliance in international climate regimes
(Barrett and Stavins, 2003; Victor, 2003) noting that successful imple-
mentation means high levels of participation and compliance. Barrett
and Stavins (2003), commenting on the Kyoto Protocol, i nd that it does
not induce signii cant participation and compliance and propose dif erent
approaches to improve it by of ering positive or negative incentives. In the
Montreal Protocol, for instance, a threat of restrictions on trade of CFCs
or products containing CFCs between the countries participating in the
agreement and those not participating proved successful in motivating
more countries to participate. However, it is commonly acknowledged,
especially in the case of the Kyoto Protocol, that compliance alone (even
if fully achieved) cannot always mitigate the environmental problem,
since some of the heavier polluters might not choose to participate in the
agreement at all.
Transparency, openness and participation: one of the issues requir-
ing attention from international environmental regime practitioners and
scholars is transparency and openness. According to Ausubel and Victor
(1992) transparency refers to the clear presentation of the regime's activi-
ties and information collected, whereas openness means access of actors
to the negotiating process and information, irrespective of whether these
actors come from within the government or not. They also note that suc-
cessful environmental regimes should provide for these conditions, since
in their case studies of arms control regimes the latter proved unsuccess-
ful partly due to concealment and restricted participation (Ausubel and
Victor, 1992). Moreover, von Moltke (2000) also stresses the importance
of transparency and participation in environmental af airs in general,
though remarkably few formal rules have been adopted in international
environmental agreements to address these needs. A i rst step in this
direction was the adoption in 1998 of the Aarhus Convention on Access
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters (von Moltke, 2000).
Domestic politics: another important factor that af ects international
environmental cooperation is change in the patterns of domestic politics.
According to Weale (1992, p. 200), domestic public policy can naturally be
af ected by actors and procedures in the international sphere. However,
