Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
comparisons between them. A weakness of this approach is the dii culty of
estimating the counterfactual by assuming hypothetical conditions in the
absence of the regime. This is largely true since assessing the current state
of the environment is dii cult in itself. Even more dii cult, if not impos-
sible, is the idea of estimating how the state of the environment would be
today if the regime in question did not exist in the i rst place. Moreover, the
basis of this technique is still qualitative since environmental improvement
and behavioural change are still assessed through qualitative case studies.
Helm and Sprinz (2000) also use counterfactual analysis based largely
on the questions Underdal posed about the object of evaluation, the
standard against which it should be evaluated and the methodological
approach used. According to them regime ef ects are improvements in
the object of evaluation, measured by application of policy instruments
leading to changes such as emission reductions. A lower bound is deter-
mined by the no-regime counterfactual (
NR
), which is the degree of
policy-instrument application that would have occurred in the absence
of the regime. An upper bound is established by the collective optimum
(
CO
), the degree of application that would have been obtained by a perfect
regime. Accordingly, the regime potential is expressed in units of policy-
instrument use and is the dif erence between the no-regime counterfactual
and the collective optimum. The actual policies executed by countries (
AP
)
usually fall into this interval. Thus, the ef ectiveness of a regime can be
measured as the percentage of the regime potential that has been achieved,
where this score falls into the interval of 0-1 (Figure 7.1).
They estimate scores by using a combination of methods such as game
theory, optimization or experts' judgements. However, their approach
has been criticized. Young (2001, pp. 110-14) points out that use of the
Nash equilibrium leaves no room for cooperation, since it assumes that all
actors try not to be taken advantage of, and it might also produce results
that are worse for everyone, compared with those that could be achieved
through other potential ways of cooperation. Moreover, he argues that the
interactive decision-making used to calculate the no-regime counterfactual
(
NR
)
(
AP
)
(
CO
)
Degree of use of instrument
Efectiveness score
ES
= (
AP
-
NR
)/(
CO
-
NR
)
where (
NR
) = no-regime counterfactual, (
CO
) = collective optimum, (
AP
) = actual performance
Source:
Helm and Sprinz (2000).
Figure 7.1
General concept for measuring regime ef ectiveness
