Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
groups (Velded, 2000). However, in line with Baland and Platteau (1995,
1996), Velded emphasized that there is a need to distinguish between
various forms of heterogeneity in analysis and explanation of collective
action, especially in relation to heterogeneity in endowments, entitlements
(wealth) and economic interests.
Kant (2000) developed an optimal control model for a dynamic
approach to forest regimes in developing economies integrating the natural
system and socioeconomic factors of the resource users. The model dem-
onstrates that the dynamics of the optimal forest regimes depend on the
change in natural factors, socioeconomic factors (user group heterogene-
ity) and on the interaction between natural and socioeconomic factors.
The model dei nes cultural, economic, ethical and other social dif erences
as a basic level of heterogeneity. Due to this basic heterogeneity, members
of the user groups may have diverse preferences for timber and non-timber
products and hence prefer a dif erent mix of products, which is considered
as second-level heterogeneity. Preference for diversii ed forest products
often leads to dif erent preferences for resource management regimes,
which can be further described as a third level of heterogeneity. Therefore,
heterogeneity with respect to resource regimes is treated as a function of
the product preference dif erences, which in turn is treated as a function of
cultural, economic and social heterogeneity. Though the model is crucial
to understanding optimal resource regimes, their linkages with socioeco-
nomic factors (heterogeneity), and the dynamics of these optimal regimes
and socioeconomic factors, it is explicit about how and to what extent
intra-community heterogeneity or wealth endowment af ects equitable
benei t-sharing mechanisms among resource users.
While there has been a great deal of work on the management of local
environmental resources in recent years, there has been surprising little
work, either theoretical or empirical, on how inequality helps or hinders
cooperative management of the local commons (Bardhan, 1999). Not much
is understood on how socioeconomic status of resource users promotes or
discourages participation in CPR management and consequently the equity
of resource distribution. Nonetheless, evidence from South Asia suggests
that the socioeconomic status of resource users may place stringent limits
on the extent to which certain groups are able to participate and benei t
from the management of CPRs. The landless, agropastoralists, and other
politically and economically marginalized user groups may not be able to
take advantage of incentives for tree growing (Guggenheim and Spears,
1991). Moreover, participatory forest management in South Asia illustrates
the sharp equity problem elsewhere since social structure itself is for the
most part inherently unequal. These resource management initiatives were
supposed to help the poorest of the village population, lighten women's
