Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
In their theoretical modelling, Baland and Platteau (1999) investigated
the impact of inequality on the ability of resource users to undertake
successful collective action with special reference to over-exploitation of
common property resources. They argued that in the voluntary provision
problem, inequality has an ambiguous impact on ei cient outcomes, while
in regulated settings it tends to reduce the acceptability of available regula-
tory schemes, which makes collective action more dii cult. Changes that
disequalize distribution of access rights through the dei nition or redei ni-
tion of property rights will have two dif erent ef ects. First, the agents who
benei t from such a change have a larger stake in the common property
resources and therefore have a greater incentive to take part in conserva-
tion ef orts. The same change has a corresponding disincentive ef ect on
the other agents whose endowments have been reduced. Since the increas-
ing inequality redistributes incentives in dif erent directions, it may have
ambiguous ef ects on the ability of users to initiate collective action. Under
such circumstances, a homogeneous group may better succeed in design-
ing and enforcing equitable conservation measures than a heterogeneous
one.
In contrast to what I have discussed earlier, heterogeneity and income
inequality in community-based property rights structures are also said to
be conducive to the successful outcome of collective action. Olson (1965)
hypothesized the possibility that groups where considerable heterogenei-
ties exist may be privileged if those with the most economic interests and
power were to initiate collective action to protect their own interests.
Wealthy users may be more concerned with resource conservation since
they can greatly internalize the benei ts generated from the commons and
therefore have more incentive to contribute to the local commons. Olson
further argued that the greater the share in the benei ts of a collective
action for any single member, the greater the propensity of this 'large'
member to bear the costs involved in commons management. In a related
vein, Baland and Platteau (1999) revealed that increasing inequality could
stimulate the incentive of the big users to voluntarily contribute and simul-
taneously encourage the small users to free-ride on the former's contribu-
tion. As a result, the net impact of inequality on collective action will hinge
upon the respective strengths of these two opposite ef ects. However, the
fact that rich users are more inclined to contribute does not imply that
increased inequality favours collective action. Again, inequality has an
ambiguous impact on collective action.
The Olson hypothesis is likely to make sense when management of a
CPR involves important 'non-convexities' in its production function.
Non-convexities indicate the large start-up costs, which are likely to be
incurred in setting up a commons management regime. These costs might
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