Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Platteau (1996, p. 301), point out that, too often, 'heterogeneity is blamed
as a matter of principle without enough ef ort being devoted to spelling
out the precise conditions under which it undermines collective action'.
Indeed, the role of group heterogeneity in the evolution of local manage-
ment institutions is ambiguous. What deserves credit in this respect is to
clarify the various forms of heterogeneity and the way they bear upon
collective action dilemmas. In the subsequent discussion I will critically
examine group heterogeneity and the success or failure of collective action
drawing upon evidence from theoretical and empirical work from both the
economic and social science literatures.
The source of heterogeneities are diverse, and include dif erences in
asset holding, appropriation skills and access to technology, caste, gender,
ethnicity, opportunity cost, political inl uence and other local dif erences,
which might inl uence the equity of resource distribution and thus per-
formance of collective action. Kant (2000, p. 288), points out, 'resource
users will often have somewhat dif erent preferences regarding resource
management, or assign dif erent priorities to the various objectives of
resource management, either because of dif ering personal interest in the
resource or dif ering degree of involvement in the social group'. The het-
erogeneity of individual interest with respect to how a resource is managed
af ects individual incentives and thus economic use of the local commons.
As rightly pointed out by Seabright (1993), the degree of trust economic
agents, participating in some form of collective action, have in one another
serves a crucial role in common property regimes. He developed a model
of 'habit forming' cooperation. The model revealed the fact that players'
belief about each other's trustworthiness is coni rmed and contributes
to cooperative behaviour. Such a 'habit-forming' process is, however,
unlikely to work in a community which starts with a high level of het-
erogeneity with respect to resource management preference (Kant, 1998).
Moreover, economic inequality or socioeconomic heterogeneity among
the members of a resource-using group might be associated with dif erent
degrees of access to, and control over, the local commons. Intra-group
heterogeneity in terms of private payof s, therefore, can often lead to con-
l icts of interest and thus hinder the emergence of egalitarian institutions
and the performance of any cooperative arrangements. Ostrom (1990)
argues that none of the successful CPR situations involves participants
who vary greatly in regard to ownership of assets, skills, ethnicity, race, or
other variables that could strongly divide a group of individuals.
Socioeconomic heterogeneity, relative income ef ect and the political
framework in which policy decisions are taken determine the benei t-
sharing arrangements in commons management. Income inequality pro-
duces the gap between poor individuals' ability to pay and willingness to
