Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
of common resources in their articles on i shery economics. Building on
Gordon and Scott, Smith (1968) provided a general theory of produc-
tion and consumption of common property resources using an algebraic
model. Smith applied his general model to i sheries, mining and timber
resources and showed how dif erences in production externalities,
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either
from production scarcity or from crowding by procedures, lead to dif erent
outcomes. Most of these articles, however, advocated that a resource held
under a common property regime is not ei cient since individual resource
users do not get proper incentives to act in a socially ei cient way.
Hardin's arguments have been formalized later on in the form of the
'Prisoner's Dilemma Game' (Runge, 1981). The prisoner's dilemma game
is conceptualized in a non-cooperative game theory in which all players
are assumed to have complete information about the game to be played.
Each player has a dominant strategy in the sense that the player is always
better of choosing a dominant strategy - to defect - no matter what the
other player does. The disturbing conclusion of prisoner's dilemma is
that rational people cannot achieve collective outcomes. However, where
the situation is a recurrent one, for example, as in the case of a repeated
game, the logic changes (Axelrod, 1981). Free-riding in this circumstance
remains a possibility but not an imperative as described in the 'Simple
Prisoner's Dilemma Game' (Runge, 1984; Sugden, 1984). Olson (1965)
also discusses the dii culty of getting individuals to act in such a way that
it increases their joint welfare. Olson challenges proponents of 'group
theory' who believe that individuals with common interests would volun-
tarily act to maximize the collective benei ts. Olson argues that unless the
number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some
other special device to make individuals act towards the overall common
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their
own common interest (Olson, 1965). The tragedy of the commons, the
prisoner's dilemma and the logic of collective action are closely related
concepts in the models that have dei ned the accepted way of viewing
many problems that individuals face when attempting to achieve collective
benei ts (Ostrom, 1998).
The tragedy of the commons metaphor confused common property
regimes with open access regimes. It did not understand the very essence
of community wisdom to act together and institute checks and balances,
rules and sanctions, for sustainable management and utilization of envi-
ronmental resources. In other words, followers of this concept after Hardin
did not understand the fact that many resources used by rural communi-
ties are not open access but are managed under community ownership.
Scholars of the commons argued that Hardin confused common property
with open access, failing to distinguish between collective property rights
