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distribution varied with different risk tolerance;
Tarakcietal.
(
2006
) found out that
the profit distribution with fixed payment and output share generally brought a win-
win; on the basis of principal-agent theory,
Zhang and Li
(
2008
)establishedanIT
outsourcing profit distribution model which combined incentive mechanism with
supervision and reward-punishment mechanism and showed out manufacturer's
best incentive strength and contractor's optimal effort level;
Huang et al.
(
2009
)
designed a reasonable incentive mechanism to prevent the contractor's moral hazard
through profit distribution;
Huang et al.
(
2011
) further studied incentive mechanism
based on the profit distribution under double moral hazard risk to make sure that
the two sides will share their personal information and make their optimal effort;
Elitzur et al.
(
2011
) made researches on the profit distribution of information
system outsourcing under double moral hazard risk.
Song et al.
(
2010
) thought
the performance of outsourcing was influenced by the contractor's effort and
manufacturer's participation, and they designed an informal contract under double
moral hazard risk and analyzed the contract's incentive effect on the two sides'
effort.
Dan et al.
(
2010
) studied the double moral hazard risk in IT outsourcing and
designed an outsourcing contract and analyzed the variables of contract parameters.
Based on maximum profit of the producer service outsourcing value chain, this
paper makes an improved principal-agent model and figures out the relevant profit
distribution parameters to get the maximum profit of both the manufacturer and
contractor and get rid of double moral hazard risk and provides theoretical support
for the profit distribution of producer service outsourcing.
2
Hypothesis
Based on the profit distribution with fixed payment and output share, we make the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.
The formula of producer service outsourcing value chain output. For
the complementary relationship between the producer service outsourcing output
and the effort of manufacturer and contractor, we use the traditional Douglas
output function to describe the output of producer service outsourcing value
chain. The producer service outsourcing output can be described as
π
(
I
,
e
)=
kI
a
e
r
(2005), where I stands for manufacturer's effort,
e
for contractor's
effort,
a
for the output coefficient of manufacturer's effort,
r
for the output coef-
ficient of contactor's effort,
+
θ
for random disturbance, and the output coefficient
k
for the outsourcing project's value. There is a positive proportional relationship
between
θ
and
k
, which means the larger
k
is, the greater the producer service
outsourcing project value. The above formula meets the following conditions:
∂π
(
π
2
2
I
,
e
)
0,
∂π
(
I
,
e
)
∂
e
0,
∂
π
(
I
,
e
)
0
∂
π
(
I
,
e
)
>
>
<
<
0, which means that when
I
,
e
I
2
e
2
∂
I
∂
∂
increase,
will also increases, but the increased speed drops. Therefore, we can
make a further hypothesis 0
π
<
<
a
,
r
1.
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