Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
When. bidders. were. in. sessions. that. received. anti-biotech. and. veriiable. informa-
tion,.bid-price.differences.are.reduced.(less.negative).and.the.difference.is.signii-
cantly. different. from. zero.. Hence,. those. who. received. a. treatment. of. anti-biotech.
information. and. veriiable. information. discounted. GM. foods. less. than. those. who.
received.only.a.treatment.of.anti-biotech.information..When.bidders.were.in.sessions.
that.received.a.treatment.that.contained.all.three.types.of.information.(pro-biotech,.
anti-biotech,. and. veriiable),. the. impact. of. this. treatment. on. bid-price. differences.
was.small.and.not.statistically.signiicant..Hence,.in.this.complex.setting,.veriiable.
information.did.not.have.a.distinguishable.effect.
Bidders.who.had. larger. household.incomes.discounted.GM.by. a.larger.amount.
than.those.with.less.household.income..This.result.is.statistically.signiicant.at.the.
5%.level.and.is.consistent.with.non-GM.products.being.viewed,.on.average,.by.bid-
ders. as. a. superior. product.. Participants. coming. into. our. experiments. were. asked.
about. how. well-informed. they. were. about. genetic. modiication.. This. subjective.
information. was. then. coded.into.a.dichotomous. variable..Those. bidders. who. con-
sidered.themselves.to.be.at.least.“somewhat.informed.about.GM.foods”.discounted.
GM-labeled.foods.more.than.did.other.bidders..This.effect.is.statistically.signiicant.
(at. the. 10%. level).. Moreover,. this. result. suggests. that. bidders. in. our. experiments.
who.were.“GM-informed”.had,.on.average,.acquired/received.negative.information.
about.GM.foods. prior. to. the.experiment.*.Bids.also.were.affected. by.the.labeling.
sequence..Bidders.in.sessions.that.bid.on.the.GM-labeled.food.products.in.round.one.
(and.the.plain-labeled.food.products.in.round.two).discounted.GM-labeled.foods.by.
less.than.those.who.were.in.sessions.that.bid.on.the.products.in.the.opposite.order..
This result reinforces the importance of randomized assignments of treatments to
sessions in experimental auctions ,.which.is.an.innovation.in.our.methodology.
Next,.we.turn.to.the.2007.sample.of.individuals.from.Des.Moines.and.Harrisburg..
In. these. results,. the. base. case. with. no-information. treatment. gives. a. bid-price.
difference.of.intragenic.GM-.over.plain-labeled.food.products.by.a.statistically.sig-
niicant.52.cents.per.unit.of.product..When.pro-biotech.information.treatment.was.
injected.into.the.experiments,.the.bid-price.difference.was.a.statistically.signiicant.
73.cents.per.unit.or.21.cents.more.than.for.the.no-information.treatment,.suggesting.a.
net.positive.inluence.of.industry-provided.biotech.information.on.willingness.to.pay.
for.intragenic.GM.products..The.injection.of.the.anti-biotech.information.treatment.
gives.a.bid-price.difference.of.only.25.cents.per.unit,.which.is.27.cents.per.unit.lower.
than.for.the.no-information.treatment..However,.this.coeficient.is.not.different.from.
zero.at.the.5%.or.10%.signiicance.levels,.suggesting.that.environmental.groups.do.
not.distinguish.between.intragenic.and.transgenic.biotech.methods.for.engineering.
new.crops..The.injection.of.a.pro-biotech.and.anti-biotech.treatment.(where.the.order.
is. random. across. participants. in. a. session). increases. the. bid. price. difference. by. a.
statistically.signiicant.56.cents.per.unit..The.impact.of.this.information.treatment.on.
bid-price.differences.is.slightly.higher.(4.cents.per.unit).than.for.the.no-information.
treatment,.which.is.a.relection.of.the.opposing.forces.of.pro-biotech.and.anti-biotech.
information,. but. with. the. edge. going. to. the. pro-biotech. information.. When. the.
* . See.Huffman.et.al. 39 .for.an.analysis.of.the.impact.of.bidders'.prior.beliefs.about.GM.technology.and.
food.products.on.their.willingness.to.pay.for.food.items.that.are.potentially.GM.
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