Consumer Acceptance of Genetically Modified Foods: Traits, Labels, and Diverse Information - Transgenic Horticultural Crops: Challenges and Opportunities - page 201

generally.labeled.in.the.United.States,.so.grocery.store.purchases.are.not.informa-
tive. on. this. issue.. Some. scientists. have. used. contingent. value. or. stated. prefer-
ence.surveys.of.consumer.willingness.to.pay.for.new.products..These.surveys.are.
known.to.contain.hypothetical.bias;.participants.in.these.surveys.are.not.required.
to. execute. their. stated. preferences,. that. is,. “participants. don't. have. to. pay. what.
they.say.” 32-34
In.contrast,.in.our.auction.market.settings,.consumers.were.expected.to.execute.
their. winning.bids. by. purchasing. one.unit. of. the.auctioned. commodity..Also,.in.
contrast.to.most.economics.experiments.that.use.university.undergraduate.students.
from.the.investigator's.class.as.auction.participants,.we.used. randomly chosen adult
consumers in major metropolitan areas .that.were.identiied.by.an.independent..survey.
agency.and.told.that.a.university.project.was.being.undertaken.to.obtain.consumers'.
assessments.of.food.and.new.household.products..In.particular,.screened.individuals.
were.not.told.that.they.would.be.assessing.genetically.modiied.organisms.(GMOs).
or.even.would.be.participating.in.an.experimental.auction.
Economists. frequently. choose. a. Vickery. 2nd. price.auction. (http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Vickrey_auction).for.valuing.goods..However,.it.is.well.known.that.individ-
uals.who.anticipate.that.they.are.far.from.placing.the.margin.bid.will.bid.randomly.
and.insincerely..These.participants.have.a.real.sense.that.their.bid.is.not.pivotal.in.
determining.the.market.price..We.chose.the.random. n th.price.auction. 35 .In.this.auc-
tion,.the.winning.bidders.are.chosen.from.a.uniform.distribution.over.1.to. n ,.the.total.
number.of.bidders.in.a.session..For.example,.if.there.are.15.participants.in.a.session,.
the.bids.are.irst.ranked.from.1.to.15,.and.the.randomly.drawn. n .is.5;.then.the.four.
highest. bidders. pay. the. ifth. highest. price.. With. this. type. of. auction. mechanism,.
all. bidders. are. engaged. because. they. sense. that. their. bid. will. help. determine. the.
.market.price,.or.bidding.their.true.willingness.to.pay.is.a.weakly.dominate.strategy. 36 .
Moreover,.our.auction.is.best.described.as.being. a sealed-bid random n th price auc-
tion ,. because no information about willingness to pay for experimental products is
released before all bids are placed .
Individuals.who.agreed.to.participate.came.to.a.central.location,.signed.a.personal.
consent.form,.were.paid.$40.for.their.participation,.and.completed.a.short.question-
naire.on.their.social-demographic-economic.characteristics.and.beliefs.about.a.few.
technologies,.including.GMOs..They.received.instruction.in.the.mechanics.of.a.ran-
dom. n th. price.auction,.and. participated. in. an.auction. practice.session..Next,.they.
took. a. short. test. on. their. understanding. of. the. auction. mechanism. and. any. ques-
tions.were.answered..The.auctioning.of.experimental.commodities.followed..After.
winning. bids. were. determined,. the. participants. completed. another. short. survey,.
and.then.were.told.to.execute.winning.binds.by.completing.purchases.of.auctioned.
commodities.in.an.adjacent.stock.room..Otherwise,.they.were.told.that.they.were.
free.to.leave.
In. all. of. our. experiments,. we. used. three. sets. of. diverse. information. about.
genetic. modiication. and. GM. foods. to. construct. information. treatments:. (1). the.
industry (pro-biotech) perspective —a. collection. of. statements. and. information.
on.genetic.modiication.provided.by.a.group.of.leading.biotechnology.companies,.
including. Monsanto. and. Syngenta;. (2). the. environmental group (anti-biotech)