HISTORICAL DICTIONARY A–Z - Russia: A Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present - page 369

the NAZI - SOVIET PACT of August 1939, which rel-
egated Finland to the Soviet sphere of influence.
Concerned that Finnish territory could serve as a
staging area for a future German attack on
Soviet territory, especially the city of Leningrad
(now St. Petersburg), the Soviet Union pressed
Finland to allow the construction of Soviet mili-
tary bases on Finnish territory. When Finland
refused, the Soviet Union revoked the 1932
nonaggression pact between the two countries
and attacked Finland without a declaration of
war on November 30, 1939. The Finns became
legendary for their spirited resistance to Soviet
troops against overwhelming odds and with little
outside assistance and for their distinctive white
uniforms.
The Soviet attack began with the bombard-
ment of Helsinki and other cities and ports,
while 20 Soviet divisions crossed the Finnish
border at various points. Led by Baron Manner-
heim, the Finnish army of three infantry divi-
sions concentrated its resistance along the
70-mile-wide Karelian isthmus, establishing a
series of fortifications known as the Manner-
heim line, and at four other points north of the
isthmus. By January 1940, the Finns had cut the
Soviet army's communication and supply lines
and in some cases forced the Soviets to retreat
into Soviet territory. Faced with a very poor
Soviet performance, Marshal Semyon K. Timo-
shenko was given command of the Soviet war
effort and quickly produced more favorable
results by concentrating on breaking the Man-
nerheim line. By February 1940, Finnish resis-
tance was weakening in the face of a costly
Soviet artillery offensive against the Manner-
heim line. The Soviets captured the city of
Summa on February 16 and Vyborg (Finnish,
Viipuri) on March 11. The following day a truce
was declared while arrangements for a peace
treaty were finalized.
At a peace treaty signed in Moscow on March
13, 1940, Finland yielded 41,888 sq km (16,173
sq mi) of its southeastern lands to the Soviet
Union, about 10 percent of its territory, includ-
ing the Karelian isthmus. Other terms of the

treaty included Finnish agreement to limit the
size of its army, a 30-year rental of Hanko penin-
sula to serve as a Soviet base, and unrestricted
transit privileges for Soviet troops across
Pechenga province. Hostilities between the two
countries resumed in June 1941, after Germany
declared war on the Soviet Union and Finland
joined the German war effort. By 1944, how-
ever, Finland sued for peace and agreed to pay
$300 million in war reparations. Finland lost
about 23,000 soldiers with another 55,000
wounded or permanently disabled. Estimates of
Soviet war losses have varied, ranging from a
Soviet estimate of 48,000 and a Finnish one of
close to 200,000 Soviet losses.

Witte, Sergei Yulevich (1848-1915)
statesman
Widely recognized as the ablest minister to serve
ALEXANDER III and NICHOLAS II , Witte left a legacy
that is especially evident in the rapid industrial
growth that Russia experienced in the 1890s. Of
Baltic ascendance, Witte was born in Tbilisi,
Georgia, and graduated with a degree in mathe-
matics from Odessa University in 1870. Before
entering government service in 1889, Witte
developed a reputation as an excellent and inno-
vative executive in railway management. His first
post in government was as director of the Min-
istry of Finance's Department of Railway Affairs.
He rose rapidly, becoming acting minister of
finance in August 1892, and minister of finance
in January 1893. As finance minister, he devised
a program for economic growth centered on pro-
tectionist tariffs, foreign loans, and railway con-
struction to promote national integration. He
accelerated the construction of the TRANS -
SIBERIAN RAILROAD and promoted the CHINESE
EASTERN RAILWAY . By 1897 his sound financial
management allowed Russia to join the gold
standard. Witte argued, with increasing lack of
success as the new century began, against Rus-
sia's imperialist policies in the Far East, favored
by other ministers and, ultimately, the czar, pre-
ferring instead to spread Russian influence