Sign, Design, Communication - Principia Designae: Pre-Design, Design, and Post-Design - page 33

never pure. here is no idealization without (identificatory) iterability; but for the same
reason, for reasons of (altering) iterability, there is no idealization that keeps itself pure,
safe from all contamination. The concept of iterability is this Singular concept that renders
possible the silhouette of ideality, and hence of the concept, and hence of all distinction, of
all conceptual opposition. (Derrida 1990 , 'Afterword' p. 119)
Then, “communication, if we retain that word, is not the means of transference
of meaning, [but] the exchange of intentions and meanings, discourse and the
communication of consciousnesses.” As a result, communication as writing
would no longer be “one species of communication and all the concepts to whose
generality writing had been subordinated (including the concept itself qua meaning,
idea or grasp of meaning and of idea, the concept of communication, of the sign,
etc.) would be denied” (Derrida 1988 , p. 20).
3.6 Force, Communication and Design
How can we begin to think in this way? When we trace a sign or a mark, the
possibilities of iterable communication will follow. If we read an animal footprint
and look for a way of follow them, there is the possibility of failure (iterability)—a
footprint or a signature can be a fake. Where there are intentional or unintentional
(natural) marks, iterable communication takes place. Or rather, a sign or a mark
forces us to read as long as we have repeatable or iterable experiences. Any sign or
mark has this power. Can this structure correspond to design? When we design
something, the possibilities of iterable communication take place. Therefore, the
design will always be detached from the context and grafted onto other contexts—it
can be transferred anywhere and may unexpectedly function, which may bring
disaster or new flourishing.
In the second phase, a design can have the force or power to communicate,
similar to the force of language. This force can be viewed as an “illocutionary act,”
a term John L. Austin introduced in his theoretical book about speech acts. Austin
identifies three types of speech acts: a locutionary act, the actual performance of
utterance; an illocutionary act, or the 'illocutionary force' of the utterance (this
force of a socially valid utterance is based on conventions); and a perlocutionary
act, which has an actual effect, such as persuading, convincing, or otherwise getting
someone to do something, whether intended or not (Austin 1962 ).
A typical example of an illocutionary act is promising or ordering someone.
When we say “Get away!” we order and do not describe a fact. Through saying to
someone “Get away!”, we order, that is, “by saying something, we do something”
(Austin 1962 , Lecture 9). The utterance of the sentence has force to bring about the
action or the performance that the sentence describes. Other examples include: “I
name this ship the Queen Elizabeth,” “I bet you six pence it will rain tomorrow,” or
“I promise to pay you back.” These are performative utterances, which have the
power of illocutionary act. In addition, Austin regards not only such performative
sentences, but also the sentence that describes the fact (the constative utterance) as
having such force.