Towards Data Democracy Beyond Fukushima - Principia Designae: Pre-Design, Design, and Post-Design - page 104

Fig. 8.2 Multiple loops to converge into design solution. Single loop learning on what, double
loop learning on how and triple loop learning on WHY. Prepared by adding issues on the
Fukushima nuclear reactor accidents after a scheme of learning (Debategraph 2014 )
simple as possible for all committed experts to understand essentially important
points. And it is also necessary to organize ad hoc design teams for these three loops
and also ad hoc three operation teams again for these three loops. In this context we
were prepared neither on safety standards at the double loop nor on emergency
evacuations at the triple loop.
As for unknowns in science and technology there used to be debates in terms of
values, risks and crisis, where risk evaluation, risk communication, risk manage-
ments and crisis managements have been endless issues. Depending on contexts, we
have risk takers and risk rejecters, and silent customers of values. Guidelines and
regulations on safety of artifacts, in general, have been or had been revised
continuously on the basis of unexpected failures and accidents by the double loop
learning as well as politics by stakeholders by the triple loop learning. In the
evolving process of guidelines and regulations, experience based approaches have
been articulated into model based approaches and data-based approaches endorsed
by traceability, and others, namely, trial and errors as the double loop learning.
Standards have been established as snapshots of such evolutions processes in
engineering knowledge infrastructures in the double loop learning, but sometimes
are under over-expectation regarded as an endpoint of the triple loop learning.
The nuclear reactors require a long time to become stable, and we are going
forward step by step with trial and errors with incremental improvements. We are
learning to derive solutions to take care the nuclear plant after the worst “Multiple